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In the electronic market place, the auction is known to be economically efficient, 
allowing players to maximize their own benefits. Through this mechanism, new spot 
markets are created, which connect buyers and sellers. In this new spot markets, many 
problem contexts give rise to competitive decision situations in which players must 
make repeated decisions along with or in response to competitors’ decisions.  
Auction-based electronic marketplaces for freight service procurement are an 
example of such environments, and provide the motivating application context for the 
models presented in this paper.   
 
The specific focus is on the decisions of carriers, as bidders for the loads tendered 
by shippers in spot market situations. This paper is about the learning models used to 
describe a player’s strategy choice behavior using experimental data and explains 
how that choice arises from the nature of multi-player interactions and their dynamics 
over multiple bids. Therefore, the principal focus of this paper is how to model a 
player’s dynamic strategy choice behavior under the pressure of competition.  
A dynamic strategy choice model structure for two type of cognitive learning 
process is formulated, with alternative specifications corresponding to different levels 
of cognition capacity. Furthermore, the dynamic strategy choice model structure for 
mixed learning is developed, which combines both elements of two different learning 
processes.  The model is intended to describe how a player or agent in a non-
cooperative game with no perfect information and bounded rationality chooses a 
bidding strategy. We propose a general dynamic strategy choice model framework 
using the dynamic mixed logit model structure and estimate the model parametrically, 
using two sets of experimental data. The paper also presents econometric issues that 
arise in estimating such models given a time series of auction bids and outcomes, and 
formulates error structures appropriate to the highly interactive dynamic nature of 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
1.1. Motivation 
The booming world of electronic commerce now provides bidders using electronic 
auction systems with virtual agents to do their bidding. In the electronic market place, 
the auction is known to be a well-established and powerful social information-
processing mechanism. In addition, it is well known to be economically efficient, 
allowing players to maximize their own benefits. Through this mechanism, new spot 
markets are created, which connect buyers and sellers. Electronic market places offer 
benefits to both buyers and sellers by reducing transaction times, costs and effort. 
Buyers can search for and compare providers easily in a marketplace; while, for 
sellers, marketplaces provide access to broad customer bases. However, a 
complicated decision-making process has emerged in the electronic market place, 
wherein auction systems now generate many benefits over traditional electronic 
market places. 
In particular, many problem contexts give rise to competitive decision situations in 
which players must make repeated decisions along with or in response to competitors’ 
decisions. The motivating problem context for this dissertation consists of auction-
based electronic marketplaces for freight service procurement. These virtual 
environments give rise to new classes of decision situations for carriers and shippers. 
The specific example that provides the motivation and the focus for the present study 
are the decisions of carriers, as bidders for the loads tendered by shippers in spot 
market situations. 
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Game theory has been the primary theoretical approach for those seeking to 
understand how markets might evolve under different assumptions on player (carriers 
in this case) behavior. It has placed considerable emphasis on equilibrium, and 
understanding the extent to which equilibria may be reached in markets under 
different information situations and payoff structures. However, most game theoretic 
constructs assume that the players (agents) have complete1 or perfect2 information, 
common knowledge3 and perfect rationality4. In practice, these assumptions are too 
restrictive for most real-world situations, especially in fast-moving dynamic 
environments with repeated auction plays. Relaxation of these assumptions places 
greater emphasis on the cognitive processes and individual characteristics of players 
in analyzing the associated decision-making processes. 
Choice behavior in non-cooperative auction games, under competitive 
environments, differs in several respects from the general travel choice behavior 
                                                 
1 Each player is aware of all other players, the timing of the game, and the set of 
strategies and payoffs for each player.  
(source: http://www.gametheory.net/Dictionary/) 
2 A sequential game is one of perfect information if only one player moves at a time 
and if each player knows every action of the players that moved before him at every 
point. (source: http://www.gametheory.net/Dictionary/) 
3 An item of information in a game is common knowledge if all of the players know it 
and all of the players know that all other players know it, and so on. (source: 
http://www.gametheory.net/Dictionary/) 
4  Players always act in a rational way, and are capable of arbitrarily complex 
deductions towards that end.  
(source: http://en.wikipedia.org/ wiki/) 
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typically considered in transportation demand studies, e.g. to represent the traveler’s 
choice of mode, departure time, residential or other location, etc. In this case, the 
other players’, as well the player’s own, previous decisions and payoffs affect current 
choice and payoff. The high degree of interaction among competitors is a critical 
phenomenon in dynamic game situations. Furthermore, players in a game can 
communicate with each other by exchanging information about strategies and payoffs, 
either explicitly or implicitly, through imitation and adaptation of successful 
strategies. However, typical discrete choice model formulations for everyday 
transportation demand situations do not include the impact of such interaction among 
decision makers in their respective choice behavior, because competition is not a 
consideration in these decision situations. In dynamic auction games, one’s strategy 
depends on whether other players are bidding their value or are shading their bids. 
Players can learn how to play those games over time, and can update their belief by 
learning how to play based on their past experience and acquired knowledge of the 
opponents’ actions and their payoffs. However, that type of information is limited to 
the type of auction and public information disclosed by auctioneers. This dissertation 
uses concepts from both discrete choice models and game theory to develop 
descriptive dynamic strategy choice models in competitive environments. 
 
1.2. Research Objectives  
The main objective of this research has been to develop a theoretical framework 
and methodology to model a player’s dynamic strategy choice behavior within a 
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competitive environment, by extending and adapting the existing model framework. 
This dissertation explores how bidders compete in auction-based electronic 
marketplaces for freight-service procurement. The study considers the carrier’s choice 
of strategy of how much to bid to acquire a tendered load in an auction-based 
marketplace with repeated auctions involving the same set of players. A dynamic 
strategy choice model structure for two type of cognitive learning process is 
formulated, with alternative specifications corresponding to different levels of 
cognition capacity. Furthermore, the dynamic strategy choice model structure for 
mixed learning is developed, which combines both elements of two different learning 
processes.  The model is intended to describe how a player or agent in a non-
cooperative game with no perfect information and bounded rationality chooses a 
bidding strategy. The study also addresses econometric issues that arise in estimating 
such models given a time series of auction bids and outcomes, and formulates error 
structures appropriate to the highly interactive dynamic nature of competitive auction-
based marketplaces. The model structure and estimation process are illustrated using 
a data set obtained from experiments conducted with players in hypothetical bidding 
situations. 
The specific goals of this research are as follows:  
1. To state and formulate a player’s cognitive-process behavior and his or her 
dynamics in bidding behavior under two different assumptions: i) the 
availability of feedback information; and ii) the level of cognitive and 
instrumental rationality.  
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2. To develop mathematical models with which to capture a player’s dynamic 
competitive behavior relating to bidding price choice under different 
assumptions of that player’s level of cognition capability. More specifically, 
a. To provide the mathematical framework for the dynamic multinomial 
probit model (DMNP) 
b. To provide the mathematical framework for the dynamic mixed (or 
kernel) logit model (DML) 
The models described in this dissertation extend previous work (Lam 1991; Liu 
1997; Srinivasan 2000), by incorporating a model framework for a player’s 
competitive bid-price choice behavior. A new error structure is explored to capture 
players’ interactions during their respective choice behaviors, which is different from 
the error structure of the existing model framework. Furthermore, the joint choice 
probability function among players is applied to estimate parameters in learning 
models, and it is formulated differently for both the dynamic multinomial probit and 
the dynamic mixed logit models. 
3. To present the different model specifications of the epistemic and behavioral 
reinforcement learning processes. 
Each cognitive learning model specification is different, depending upon the 
different levels of player cognition capacity and the limit of feedback information.  
 6 
4. To present the model specifications for a mixed-learning process, so as to 
provide a general form of model specification that incorporates both the 
epistemic and behavioral reinforcement learning models. 
The processes can be mixed, if associated with different periods, players or 
mechanisms, and deepened by incorporating the reasoning principles.  
5. To estimate parameters for a dynamic player’s bid-price choice behavior 
model, using experiment panel data in hypothetical bidding situations 
Even though the data are obtained from experiments in which decision-makers are 
in hypothetical bidding situations, the data are useful for developing insights into the 
underlying players’ strategy choice behavioral processes, and into their decision-
making interactions during choice behaviors.  
6. To comparatively analyze and interpret a player’s strategy choice behavior 
between different cognitive learning processes. 
The explanatory analysis results generated for two cognitive learning processes 
and using two types of experimental data are compared, so as to provide insights into 
each player’s underlying behaviors. The estimation results are interpreted and 
compared to explain players’ strategy choice behavior within the context of each 
learning model. Behavioral patterns generated by the two cognitive learning 
processes also are compared. In addition, the possible transferability of behavioral 
insights and models across learning processes are examined. 
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1.3. Research Approach 
This research starts by studying the cognitive dynamics of four learning processes, 
ordered in terms of a player’s decreasing cognitive capacities. Two intermediate 
learning processes, epistemic and behavioral reinforcement, are explored, while two 
extreme processes, eductive and evolutionary, are excluded in this dissertation.  
Based upon these cognitive learning concepts, the mathematical frameworks are 
formulated to incorporate a player’s competitive behavior into a strategic choice 
decision-making process. Also, two experiments including two types of game are 
conducted to collect datasets, including observations of player’s bid price decisions in 
repeated auction games. The dynamic strategy choice models are specified and 
estimated using experimental data and model frameworks associated with the 
different types of cognitive learning behavior. More specifically, the major tasks of 
this dissertation are: 
1. To develop a framework to incorporate a player’s interaction effect into the 
decision-making process by which a player changes his or her strategy for 
winning the next game and maximizing personal payoffs.  
The model framework assumes that players change their strategy based upon their 
past experiences or the beliefs about what other players will do. 
2. To conduct an experimental survey and collect data to observe players’ 
choice-decision behaviors under conditions in which different levels of 
feedback information are available to them.  
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Those experiments include a player’s bidding history in repeated games, including 
past bidding price decisions.  
3. To specify the dynamic strategy choice models for epistemic and behavioral 
reinforcement learning processes.  
The components of these models are derived from the first task by developing a 
framework for the cognitive learning process. The model specifications are different, 
depending upon the assumptions behind each cognitive learning process.  
4. To develop the mixed type of dynamic strategy choice model for use 
formulating the general model specifications that both epistemic and 
behavioral reinforcement learning processes might explain. 
This mixed learning model can combine the elements of two seemingly-different 
approaches and include them as a special case.  
5. To formulate error structures appropriate for the highly-interactive dynamic 
nature of competitive auction-based marketplaces, and to specify the joint 
probability function over players. 
6. To estimate the parameters in the dynamic strategy choice model specification 
system used for epistemic and behavioral reinforcement learning processes, 
using experimental data in hypothetical bidding situations.  
Estimated parameters capture the effect of a player’s past experiences and his or 
her average payoff in a behavioral reinforcement learning model. They also capture 
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the effect of a player’s possible payoff based upon beliefs regarding the type of 
opponent they are facing in epistemic learning model. Moreover, the unobserved 
influences of a player’s competitive interaction on the decision-making process are 
captured in error structures. Both models include habit persistence terms, which 
capture the effect of previous utility and unobserved serial correlations on the current 
player’s strategy choice decision, over various time periods (or games). 
7. To examine the transferability of a player’s bidding behavior between 
epistemic and behavioral-reinforcement learning models, and to compare the 
substantive insights generated from each of these two ‘pure’ cognitive 
learning models to those generated using a mixed (hybrid) dynamic strategy 
choice model. 
8. To estimate the parameters for the mixed learning dynamic strategy choice 
models using experimental data. 
The estimation results indicate the effect of a player’s past experiences and his or 
her average payoff in a behavioral reinforcement learning model and the effect of a 
player’s possible payoff based upon beliefs regarding the type of opponent they are 
facing in epistemic learning model. In addition, estimated parameters show the 
player’s propensity of each cognitive learning process and capture the effect of the 
interaction among players’ cognitive learning rules. 
9. To interpret a player’s choice-decision behavior for each cognitive learning 
process. To compare the results from both cognitive learning processes and 
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explain how players behave differently in response to limited feedback 
information.  
The present dissertation essentially considers how well simple learning models, 
motivated by the psychology of learning, can model who must learn about the game 
and who must learn about their opponent during the course of playing a game, over 
time. Our goal is to model observed behavior, starting with behavior that is observed 
in experimental settings. In conclusion, we also consider the implications of this 
approach for applied economics in naturally-occurring, non-experimental settings. 
We show that experimental data can be both well-described and robustly-predicted by 
relatively simple learning theories. 
































of player's strategy choice
behavior
OBJECTIVE
Develop the theoretical framework and
methodology to model the player's
dynamic strategy choice behavior
TASK 6
- Formulate error structures
- Specify joint probability
 




1.4. Organization of the Dissertation  
The organization of this dissertation proposal is as follows. Already, the 
introduction chapter has provided a brief overview, including problem definitions, the 
motivation behind the project, the approach and the objectives of this dissertation. In 
Chapter 2, the four cognitive learning processes are reviewed. These processes are: 1) 
eductive learning; 2) epistemic learning; 3) behavioral reinforcement learning; and 4) 
evolutionary learning. Chapter 3 summarizes the literatures and, while doing so, 
discuss five related topics: 1) Competitive Environments in Auctions; 2) Nash 
Equilibrium vs. Probabilistic Equilibrium: Noisy Behavior in Auctions; 3) Game 
Theory vs. Discrete Choice Modeling; 4) Game Theoretic Learning Models; and 5) 
Choice Models. 
Chapter 4 presents the methodology used for the current research. The research 
methodology includes both the dynamic multinomial probit and dynamic mixed logit 
model frameworks for both the epistemic and behavioral learning processes. Chapter 
5 presents the results of the explanatory analysis generated using the above-
mentioned methodology, using two experimental datasets. Chapter 6 presents 
estimation results for the dynamic strategy choice model, using a dynamic 
multinomial probit estimation program for all of the cognitive learning processes, and 
then discusses these results. In Chapter 7, the dynamic mixed logit model estimation 
results for the dynamic strategy choice behavior are presented for both experiments.  
The last chapter provides a summary of and conclusions derived from this dissertation. 
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Chapter 2. Cognitive Learning Processes 
2.1. Background Review 
Modeling a player’s choice of bidding strategy in an auction-type electronic 
marketplace, given observations of the sequences of actions and respective payoffs 
for multiple players, entails explicit assumptions about 1) the availability of 
information to the players, and 2) the associated cognitive-learning or adaptation 
process taking place in this environment. The adaptive rule considers each player’s 
cognitive capacity, and results in certain model structures. This section presents the 
four cognitive learning processes principally recognized in the literature. The 
methodology section subsequently introduces two model specifications associated 
with two of these four learning processes, and introduces the framework used to 
estimate the corresponding dynamic strategy choice behavior models. 
Each process is distinguished by the player's cognitive ability, which is broken 
down into two steps:  1) his/her available information to his intended strategy; and 2) 
two types of rationality: cognitive rationality and instrumental rationality (Walliser, 
1998). Cognitive rationality deals with consistency between available information and 
constructed beliefs. Instrumental rationality entails consistency between given 
opportunities and fixed preferences, to determine strategies from prior expectations 
(Walliser, 1998). Each cognitive learning process has a different level of cognitive 
and instrumental rationality. 
The four types of cognitive processes introduced by Walliser (1998) consist of the 
 14 
following, listed in decreasing order of a player’s cognitive capacity:   (1) eductive 
learning; (2) epistemic learning; (3) behavioral reinforcement learning; and (4) 
evolutionary learning. Figure 2.1 shows the decreasing order of cognitive capacity for 
each learning process. As noted, each type of cognitive learning process is 
differentiated from the others by the respective levels of cognitive and instrumental 
rationality. These can be described as follows: 
- Eductive process: “each player has enough information to perfectly 
simulate the others' behavior and gets immediately to the equilibrium” 
(Walliser, 1998).  
- Epistemic learning: “each player updates his beliefs about others' future 
strategies, with regard to their sequentially observed actions.” (Walliser, 
1998). (e.g. Belief Based Model) 
- Behavioral reinforcement learning: “each player modifies his own 
strategies according to the observed payoffs obtained from his past 
actions.” (Walliser, 1998).  
- Evolutionary learning: “each agent has a fixed strategy and reproduces in 
proportion to the utilities obtained through stochastic interactions.” 









Decreasing Order of Cognitive Capacity
 
Figure 2.1 Order of cognitive rationality by learning process  
This study excludes two extreme cases - eductive learning and evolutionary 
learning - because these two learning processes assume either perfect rationality or 
null rationality. In reality, a player has a limited ability to rationalize his or her 
decisions in an auction game. This study presents two dynamic strategy choice model 
structures, corresponding to the assumptions behind the following two types of 
cognitive learning process: epistemic learning and behavior-reinforcement learning. 
 
2.2. Eductive Learning Process 
The eductive learning process (Binmore, 1987), is generally used for a one-shot 
game; it assumes that a player has complete prior information about the other players' 
rationality and about their characteristics (opportunities, prior beliefs, and 
preferences) (Walliser, 1998). Game structure is assumed to be common knowledge, 
which means that players know others’ knowledge about game. Therefore, a player 
with perfect cognitive rationality can simulate other players’ behavior.  
With eductive learning, each player enjoys perfect instrumental rationality and 
chooses a strategy by optimizing the utility function on his or her strategy set, 
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corresponding to the opponents' expected strategies. Players can simulate the 
opponent’s behavior, as well as their own behavior in a completely strategic situation. 
This strong assumption leads to pure Nash equilibrium. In the eductive process, a 
player’s behavior is perfectly described and there are no variants, since the 
assumption is that the player’s level of rationality is extremely high. 
 
2.3. Epistemic Learning Process 
Epistemic learning assumes that a repeated game is played over a sequence of 
periods. Players always know their own characteristics, but they have only 
incomplete information regarding their opponents' behavior or rationality, as they can 
observe the whole sequence of the others' decisions and draw the distribution of 
opponent’s actions. A player cannot uncover the opponents’ cognitive types from 
their choice decisions, but may simply assume their opponents’ instrumental 
rationality, such as that reflected by some form of stationarity of opponents’ behavior 
(Walliser, 1998). Epistemic learning behavior is observed easily in reality. With 
epistemic learning, a player’s behavior must be different from that observed with 
eductive learning, because beliefs are updated with respect to time and chosen actions. 
However, the observation and computational costs are higher for epistemic versus 
eductive learning. 
Limited cognitive rationality of players is assumed, since they determine their 
strategy through conjecture about their opponent’s future strategy, based on an 
observation of his/her past actions. Accordingly, players choose a best response to 
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their present conjecture regarding others' strategies each period. A player predicts the 
other's future actions as some combination of past occurrences. The important feature 
of this epistemic learning model is specifying prior beliefs and computing an initial 
value of preference, based on that prior belief.  
 
2.4. Behavioral Reinforcement Learning Process 
The behavioral reinforcement learning process is also used for repeated games. A 
player always knows his/her own opportunities, but he/she is no longer aware of the 
type of opponent or his/her past actions and payoffs. A player having weak cognitive 
rationality only knows his/her past experiences, and revises his/her experience 
according to the utility obtained from each strategy in past actions. With behavioral 
reinforcement learning, each player has limited rationality, so that he or she imitates 
past actions, which are reinforced by strategies that have succeeded and inhibited by 
strategies that have failed in past games. Moreover, each player may imitate the 
behavior of other players who have succeeded in the past, if their strategies and 
results are readily observable. Hence, the utility of a player is updated by observing 
his or her sequence of actions and corresponding payoffs.   
Behavioral reinforcement learning behavior again takes place in real time, and 
always is achievable, since behavioral reinforcement learning can be applied easily 
from period to period (Walliser, 1998). In addition, the information and computation 
costs are lower than for epistemic learning, since only the player's own results are 
checked and memorized, and expectations about other players’ actions are not 
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included in the computational process. Specifying the player’s own preference and 
computing the initial value of that preference comprise the crucial features of the 
behavioral reinforcement learning model.  
In epistemic learning, players try to find the maximum payoff, based on their 
opponents’ choice probability, but in this case, even if a player has information about 
his/her opponent’s choice, he/she just observes and imitates the best response of the 
competitors. 
 
2.5. Evolutionary Learning Process 
An evolutionary process also assumes a repeated game. A player is no longer 
aware of the game structure and only has information about his/her actions if the 
strategies depend on it. With evolutionary learning, each player has no cognitive 
rationality. A player behaves in a preprogrammed, time-invariant and unconscious 
way to choose a strategy, and his or her action automatically is decided based upon 
behavior type: ‘if context C, then action A’ (Walliser, 1998). A player does not make 
his/her own decision, since that player’s behavior is not determined at an individual 
level any more but at a population or subpopulation level. Also, each player has null 
instrumental rationality, since a player is not aware of his/her utility; only the modeler 
has that information. This learning process is a highly-adaptive model, since new 
information is used at a subpopulation level to identify a new direction associated 




As stated earlier, the four cognitive learning processes, from eductive to 
evolutionary learning, can be ordered by decreasing cognitive capacity and 
decreasing information about one’s strategic environment. In eductive learning, a 
player has complete knowledge about his opponent’s behavioral rules and beliefs, and 
players can forecast their own future strategies in all circumstances. In epistemic 
learning, the player has limited information about others' past actions and payoffs, but 
players are no longer aware of the opponent’s behavior principles. A player can 
formulate expectations regarding their opponent’s strategies. In behavioral learning, 
players can access information about their actions and payoffs by observing their 
successes and failures in the past. With the evolutionary process, the player 
eventually acquires information about their actions from subpopulation decisions, and 
he or she can choose to imitate those subpopulation decisions. 
In addition, progressing from eductive to evolutionary learning, the decision-
maker holds increasingly limited information about his own type, and is endowed 
with decreasing instrumental rationality. With the eductive process, the player 
maximizes his expected utility under known constraints, including information that 
perfectly predicts the opponent’s strategies. In epistemic learning, the player 
considers a utility function limited to short-term effects, since he or she observes 
other opponent’s decisions in the past and then decides his or her action depending on 
that information. In behavioral learning, the player simply adapts his or her behaviors 
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to past utility, in a probabilistic way. In the evolutionary process, the player no longer 
improves his utility, but adapts via a subpopulation utility-increasing mechanism 
(Walliser, 1998).  
2.6.2. Interaction 
A player’s decision is affected by interactions between competitors, and this 
causes stochastic decision-making behaviors. The stochastic elements occur from 
disturbances related to imperfect observations and incomplete modeling. The eductive 
process reduces stochastic elements by providing the possibility of mixed strategies, 
since a player can predict other players’ strategies. In epistemic learning, players' 
beliefs regarding others' behaviors are affected by stochastic uncertainty (Goyal-
Janssen, 1995). Players' observations of other’s results are affected by sample bias in 
behavioral learning, because there is no information about the opponent’s type. Also, 
the player’s own behavior becomes probabilistic. In the evolutionary process, player’s 
meetings to make subgroups are stochastically driven (Walliser, 1998).  
2.6.3. Dynamics 
In general, from eductive to evolutionary learning, the learning processes are less 
and less affected by the virtual dynamics of game simulation in a player’s mind, and 
more and more affected by the real dynamics of game progress, as a result of the 
player’s moves (Walliser, 1998). With eductive learning, there is no dynamic in 
outside reality, since the player completely simulates the player’s behavior, with 
common knowledge in his mind, before making a decision in all games. In epistemic 
learning, the objective dynamic effects are more involved with the opponent’s past 
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actions, which are incorporated in the players' beliefs and expectations. Behavioral 
reinforcement learning shows that subjective dynamics affect a player’s decision-
making behavior and are included in the prediction of his or her own actions in the 
future, resulting from observing the player’s own past actions. In evolutionary 
learning, the reproduction of the next population’s distribution involves stochastic 
matches (as a subgroup) of players, which demonstrate the dynamics (Walliser, 1998). 
Therefore, evolutionary learning assumes that there is pure temporality without 
reasoning.  
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Chapter 3. Literature Review: Theoretical Principles 
This chapter presents the characteristics of auction games and reviews the relevant 
literatures on game and choice theories. The dissertation deals with a sequential-
decision type of game and related cognitive learning models for strategic and 
bounded rational players. We focus on the literatures regarding dynamic learning and 
decision choice models that have been studied fundamentally in game and choice 
theories. In particular, the game theory literature related to decision behaviors in 
sequentially-repeated games is reviewed. This chapter includes an overview of 
existing cognitive learning and dynamic choice model frameworks. 
Section 1 describes the definition and concepts of auctions as pricing mechanisms 
and the competitive circumstances that exist in auction games. In Section 2, Nash 
equilibrium and probabilistic equilibrium are compared. In Section 3, game theory 
and choice theory are compared. Section 4 discusses the assumptions of cognitive-
learning models, based on the game theory in experimental economics, and presents 
the existing model frameworks for cognitive learning processes. Section 5 presents 
two types of dynamic choice model, and discusses the assumptions and estimation 
procedures that exist in choice models 
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3.1. The Competitive Environment of Auctions  
3.1.1. Auctions as a Price Decision Mechanism    
Fixed-pricing or static time-differential pricing mechanisms are widely used in 
many existing electronic markets, because of their simplicity. However, in reality, 
there is variation in customers’ demands over time. For this reason, those fixed 
pricing mechanisms are insufficient. Therefore, the importance issues of e-services 
and efficient pricing have emerged in existing electronic markets. Price is an 
important signal for controlling fair allocation of resources (Lee and Szymanski, 
2005). However, people have difficulty making price decisions, because of the variant 
dynamics of pricing. An auction can be a solution. An auction is a continuously-
adjustable dynamic pricing mechanism that adapts efficiently to changing market 
conditions. 
Auctions are market institutions with an explicit set of rules determining resource 
allocation and prices, based on bids from market participants (McAffee and McMillan, 
1987). The design of an auction and a specified set of rules determine the type of 
auction model, the outcomes of the auction, and the system by which bidding is 
conducted, how information is revealed, how communication is structured between 
buyers and sellers, and how allocations and payments are settled (Figliozzi, 2004).  
This dissertation does not deal with the design of an auction; rather, it analyzes 
how the dynamic learning process is conducted, or how information is processed in 
an auction game. The study contained herein adopts existing standard auction 
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mechanisms and analyzes the effect of the competitive environment of the auction on 
players’ bidding decisions. The decision problem is strategic in nature, due to the 
interdependence of competitors’ bids, costs and profits (Figliozzi, 2004). Therefore, 
the competitive player’s behavior is analyzed in the dynamic strategy choice model 
context. 
As mentioned before, auctions are mechanisms for determining the price of an 
object or a service in the presence of multiple bidders, and can be analyzed as a 
choice game. In electronic market environments, the use of an auction provides 
several benefits. First, auctions generally are easy to understand, and they are easy to 
access by both customers and service providers. Second, the rules and procedures of 
an auction system usually are easy to implement in automated electronic 
environments (Bichler, 2001). Third, an auction eliminates any need for defining 
complex dynamic pricing structures. Fourth, auctions support decentralized pricing 
and, therefore, avoid abusive market practices (McAfee and McMillan, 1997). Fifth, 
auction mechanisms are remarkable, since the auction form relies on modern social 
information processing technologies (Milgrom, 1998). Interactive network 
technology makes it easy for decision makers to access the auction mechanisms.   
Furthermore, auction-based electronic marketplaces for the procurement of 
transportation services are believed to provide a high level of service for shippers, 
while controlling and reducing their operational costs. Carriers also benefit through 
easier access to the market, and via more efficient operations associated with fewer 
empty movements.  
 25 
3.1.2. Bounded Rationality under Price Competition in a Market 
In the classic model of price competition, named after Bertrand (1883), 
equilibrium, when at least two firms are in the market, exists when price is equal to 
marginal cost. In effect, each firm makes zero profits, even in a duopoly. Since 
observations from real markets are not matched with this result, this phenomenon is 
called the ‘Bertrand Paradox’. It reports the dynamic results of markets in which 
participants compete for prices: the effect of changing the number of competitors on 
outcomes of the market. The next situation explains the Bertrand model, and 
demonstrates the unique circumstance of Nash equilibrium, in which both firms 
choose zero value. 
It is assumed that, if more than two firms intend to compete in the market, at least 
two of them will choose zero in any equilibrium. This game can generate examples of 
common critiques of the Bertrand model and Nash equilibrium. In particular, it has 
been argued, among economists, that certain assumptions of the Bertrand model and 
Nash equilibrium are not realistic. They point out that the Bertrand paradox goes 
away if the assumption is relaxed, if goods are not assumed to be homogeneous, if 
capacity constraints are introduced, or if firms are allowed to compete repeatedly 
(Dufwenberg and Gneezy, 1998). Furthermore, firms may have incomplete 
information about payoffs and cost functions or demands. Economists suggest an 
explanation that relies on bounded rationality. This illustrates the effect of ‘noise’ on 
the variability of decision outcomes, when there is competition among players.  
Dufwenberg and Gneezy (1998) proved that, if any firm in the market may bid 
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differently from Nash equilibrium as the outcome of a Bertrand model, this explains 
why deviations from the Bertrand outcome depend upon competition between a 
number of agents. Based upon this theoretical prediction, all firms are supposed to 
submit the lowest possible bid, irrespective of how many agents are in attendance. 
However, when investigators have tested this model experimentally, they have 
discovered that, during the initial stage (the first game), competitors set prices higher 
than they would with Nash equilibrium. In subsequent rounds, if more than two 
competitors attend the game, the winning bids typically converge rather rapidly 
towards the theoretical prediction, in two out of three treatments. These experimental 
findings suggest that learning plays a role, since behavior tends not to be consistent 
across time in all games.  
In reality, it seems unlikely that each agent is fully convinced that every other 
agent will behave in accordance with equilibrium, since they assume that competitors 
are fully rational and have perfect information. A little bit of irrationality can occur in 
the variability of decision behavior in a game, and this differs from the theoretical 
prediction generated by Nash equilibrium, even if a large enough number of 
competitors interact. Accordingly, the effect of competition among competitors is a 
critical factor to explain a player’s bidding behaviors while decision making.  
3.1.3. Effect of Multiple bidders on Bid Decisions in Online Auctions 
An analysis of sequential auctions can be applied for the same good, ordered in 
time. Online sequential auctions are different from non-internet sequential auctions, 
in that the number of auctions is not fixed. Bidders enter those auctions at different 
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times, and may have participated in different numbers of auctions. This uncertainty in 
bidding behavior is an interesting issue. Few studies have studied the theory of 
optimal bidding strategy in sequential auctions. It is very good model by which to 
show how uncertainty may affect bidders’ bidding strategy.  
Arora et al (2003) assume that uncertainty occurs because of a lack of information 
about the number of bidders. The bidder is assumed to know the distribution of the 
reservation values of the other bidders, but the actual values are private to each bidder. 
Under the certainty assumption, the optimal bidding price is independent of the 
strategies of other bidders during the first auction. These investigators proved that 
bidders would like to bid less than their reservation values in a first auction (a player 
submits the highest bid price win the game). If they have greater payoffs in the 
second auction, a lower bidding price is provided. When the number of bidders 
increases, each bidder faces more competition in the second auction, which makes the 
second auction less valuable to him or her. Hence, bidders increase their bids during a 
first auction (Arora et al, 2003). 
If the number of bidders is unknown, the optimal bidding price is independent of 
the number of bidders participating in the first auction, and it is independent of the 
first auction bidding function. This implies that rational bidders will bid higher if they 
expect a larger number of bidders in a second auction (Arora et. al, 2003). Under 
risky or uncertain circumstances, bidders will bid less in the first auction, in order to 
win the game, if the second auction is anticipated to be more risky. Under conditions 
of bidding uncertainty, these investigators assumed that bidders only perceive the 
distribution functions of a number of bidders. This demonstrates the impact of the 
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mean number of bidders, and its variability on a new bidder’s strategy. Both the mean 
number of bidders and its variability in the subsequent second auction affect a new 
bidder’s decision in the first auction. A larger mean number of bidders in the second 
auction means more competition, therefore less value to new bidders; hence, new 
bidders bid higher during the first auction. In on-line auctions, we are not able to 
observe the market participants’ expected number of bidders, nor are we able to 
observe the perceived variance in the number of bidders.  
It is critical, then, to distinguish what the difference is between online and offline 
sequential auctions. The number of bidders in online auctions is likely to vary 
stochastically. In on-line auctions, more uncertainty can exist than in non-online 
auctions, and this affects the competition between players. Those uncertainty factors 
should be modeled and included as components of the utility function, and as 
unobserved noise factors.  
 
3.2. Nash Equilibrium vs. Probabilistic Equilibrium: Noisy Behavior in Auctions 
This section introduces the probabilistic equilibrium models proposed by Andern, 
Goeree and Holt (1999), especially their logit equilibrium model of noisy behavior in 
auction-like games with a ‘Traveler’s Dilemma’ example. This illustrates why we 
need to study the dynamic learning process and why we need to develop a dynamic 
strategy choice model structure. Additionally, it suggests to which cases those 
suggested models are most appropriately applied.  
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Nash equilibrium (strategic equilibrium) is a list of strategies, one for each player, 
which has the property that no player unilaterally can change his strategy and acquire 
a better payoff (Osborne, 2004). Nash equilibrium in these types of games is 
insensitive to parameter changes. It cannot show the effect of randomness, called 
‘noise’, that can occur, because of unobserved shocks in preference. More often, it 
appears when the observed payoffs become approximately equal. This randomness 
can be modeled using a probabilistic choice function, such as a logit or probit model. 
The probabilistic choice related to noisy behavior is introduced by being incorporated 
within these payoff asymmetry effects. A probabilistic choice function can be applied 
to the expected payoffs or to the utility, and this probability distribution satisfies a 
‘rational expectations’ consistency condition (Anderson, Goeree, and Holt, 1999). 
A probabilistic choice rule is to specify the utility function with a stochastic 
component, reflecting unobserved factors. A player is assumed to choose decision j  
such as claim amounts (bid price) and certain kinds of strategy choice sets. If j
nx  
denotes player n ’s decision j  with expected payoff )( jnxπ , the utility function is the 
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where  
)( jnxπ : player n ’s payoff by choosing decision j  
µ : a positive ‘error’ parameter 
j
nε : the realization of a random variable 
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Here, if the coefficient is close to zero ( 0=µ ), then the decision with higher 
values of expected payoff is selected. This result is matched with the expected result 
from Nash equilibrium.  
In this case, this utility function includes only one parameter (payoff), but also an 
error term. In this dissertation, a sequential auction game is considered, and we 
develop different model specifications and error structures associated with the 
uncertainty of a player’s behavior and the player’s level of cognitive capacity, based 
upon that player’s dynamic learning process. 
A choice density is proportional to an exponential function of expected payoffs  
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The above equation shows the differential equation in equilibrium choice density. 
This payoff function can vary with the type of auction. The choice probabilities are a 
smoothly-increasing function of expected payoffs, so that these probabilities are 
affected by the asymmetries in the cost of deviating from the payoff-maximizing 
decision (Anderson, Goeree, and Holt, 1999). The logit rule determines players’ 
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equilibrium distributions. This is known as a logit equilibrium. The logit equilibrium 
equation can be derived by understanding the learning and evolutionary dynamics 
that exist in games. In general, learning can be modeled in terms of beliefs about 
others’ decisions in epistemic learning, and in terms of a player’s own experienced 
payoff during behavioral reinforcement learning. 
The traveler’s dilemma is very good example of what the difference is between 
Nash equilibrium and logit equilibrium. It also explains why the logit equilibrium 
equation is more realistic than the Nash equilibrium concept. The following 
paragraph explains the situation that exists in traveler’s dilemma, as described by 
Basu (1994):  
 “Two travelers returning home from a remote island discover that the identical 
antiques they bought have been lost in the airplane. The airline manager proposes the 
following scheme to bring out the value of the articles. The two travelers are 
instructed to independently submit compensation claims between $80 and $200. The 
airline will reimburse each traveler the minimum of the two claims. In addition, if the 
claims differ, a reward of $80 will be paid to the person making the smaller claim and 
a penalty of $80 deducted from the reimbursement for the larger claimant.” (Basu, 
1994) 
In the traveler’s dilemma game, the unique Nash equilibrium claims $80 for both 
players. However, it seems very unrealistic that any individual, no matter how 
rational, will submit an $80 claim. 
Capra, Goeree, Gomez, and Holt (1997) collected laboratory datasets to test the 
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above traveler’s dilemma experiment. Their laboratory data revealed the frequency of 
claims and that the prediction of this model is sensitive to changes in penalty/reward. 
As the penalty increases, the probability increases that the claim is close to the unique 
Nash prediction. As the penalty decreases, the probability increases that the claim will 
be far from the unique Nash prediction ($80). For the low penalty case, Nash 
equilibrium cannot explain the player’s strategy choice behavior; because there is 
more unobserved stochastic factors affecting the player’s strategy choice decision. 
These examples demonstrate that the probabilistic equilibrium approach can be 
applied to a wide variety of interesting economic contexts. In this case, for both low 
and high-penalty cases, the probabilistic choice model can describe a players’ 
behaviors and can statistically match the actual claims and frequency datasets.  
Anderson, Goeree, and Holt (1999) proposed that logit equilibrium is a one-
parameter generalization of Nash, by including the unobserved shock of preference as 
an error term. It can be evaluated using a maximum likelihood estimation of the 
laboratory data. Logit equilibrium can explain human decision behaviors for both 
one-shot and multiple-shot games. The Nash equilibrium value is probably close to 
the optimal value for the one-shot game case. In this experiment, the investigators 
believed that the error term explained the unobserved behavior. Moreover, the 
coefficient of the error parameter,µ , reflects human behavior, because no one can be 
perfectly rational and have full information. Higher values of the error parameter µ  
make choice probabilities less sensitive to expected payoffs. This means that we need 
to specify what other factors can affect the decision-making process in the game, and 
how differently we can model it. Therefore, we can add more specific public or 
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private information parameters to the utility function, including the payoff function, 
in order to specify more unobserved factors.  
Choice is stochastic, and the distribution of random variables determines the form 
of the choice probability. Therefore, if the random variable is normally distributed, 
the probit model can be applied; whereas the logit model is used for random variables 
with a Gummble distribution. In a simple case, Anderson et al (1999) applied the 
logit model with strong assumptions about the unobserved error term. The random 
components of the utilities of the different alternatives in the MNL model were 
assumed to be independent and identically distributed (IID), and to have a Gumbel 
distribution. Also, the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) property holds in 
the logit model (Ben-Akiva and Lerman, 1985). The above previous researches could 
not consider the interactions among players, because of this strong assumption in 
error terms. We have come to realize the limitations of the MNL model; hence, the 
new dynamic multinomial and mixed logit models are applied in this dissertation. 
 
3.3. Game Theory and Discrete Choice Modeling 
Game theory has developed to provide insight into the outcome of game situations 
under different behavioral assumptions regarding the players’ preferences and 
decision rules, and various assumptions about information availability and other game 
settings. Game theory has provided a natural first approach to analyze auction-based 
electronic marketplaces that have been popularized through the Internet for a variety 
of general-purpose and specialized applications. Such marketplaces for freight service 
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procurement allow carriers to interact dynamically with shippers in the competitive 
acquisition of shipments (loads), and the assignment of loads to carrier fleets. Carriers 
compete by bidding for shipments tendered by the shippers. Recent work by Figliozzi, 
Mahmassani and Jaillet (2003a, 2003b, 2005) has focused on the effect of dynamics 
on bidding behavior, and developed a model framework for examining the 
performance of such marketplaces in terms of carrier profit and shipper service levels. 
That work has also highlighted the limitations of classical game theory in capturing 
dynamic interaction effects on bidders’ behavior in repeated auction games (Figliozzi, 
2004).  
The perspective adopted in this study is that of an analyst or observer (which may 
also be a competitor) seeking to predict the outcome of the bidding process followed 
by a player in a repeated auction game. Because real situations may depart 
significantly from the ideal conditions assumed in classical game theory, especially 
with respect to the dynamics of information in repeated games, we present a dynamic 
strategy choice model framework that recognizes, in specification and 
parameterization, the nature of multi-player interaction and its dynamics over 
multiple bids (plays). Given actual observations of carrier bids under specific 
information availability scenarios, the model can be calibrated to reflect the particular 
interaction patterns present in that situation. The dynamic strategy choice model 
presented in this study uses both concepts from discrete choice theory and game 
theory to model bidder (carrier) behavior in repeated auction-type games. In order to 
understand the nature of the dynamic strategy choice model, this section describes the 
differences and similarities between game theory and discrete choice models.  
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Discrete choice models are commonly used in transportation demand studies, 
marketing and other disciplines to represent and predict decisions made by 
individuals facing discrete choice alternatives. The most commonly used model forms, 
such as generalized extreme value models, multinomial probit and mixed logit, are 
derived from random utility maximization (Ben-akiva and Lerman, 1987; Train, 
2003). Decision-makers are assumed to base their choice on the relative utility they 
associate with each of the available alternatives. This utility is a latent variable, which 
depends in a systematic manner on various observable attributes of the alternative and 
the decision-maker, as well as on unobservable component which may only be known 
in distribution to an analyst interested in representing the decision-maker’s 
preferences and choice process. The form of the distribution of unobservables and its 
properties determines the mathematical form of the choice probability function. In 
typical travel decision situations addressed through discrete choice models, the 
decision maker’s evaluation of the alternatives and subsequent actions are not 
generally directly affected by other individuals’ choices or preferences; exceptions 
include instances of household interactions and/or firm level decisions which take 
place in a cooperative setting. In static applications of discrete choice models, the 
individual’s decision does not directly interact with another player’s action or payoff. 
Even applications to dynamic decision settings have generally only considered the 
individual’s own previous decisions and associated consequences (which may 
nonetheless in turn depend on the users’ collective decisions). Under competitive 
circumstances, this is not a realistic mechanism to apply. 
In game theory, players choose the strategy or action that maximizes their 
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respective payoff. As is common in microeconomic theories, game theory assumes 
that players are perfectly rational, with common knowledge and unbounded 
computational capabilities. The well-known Nash equilibrium theory is also built on 
those strong assumptions. Under a Nash equilibrium (strategic equilibrium), no player 
can attain a better payoff by unilaterally changing his/her strategy (Osborne, 2004). A 
Nash equilibrium in these types of games is insensitive to parameter changes, both 
systematic and random, e.g. unobserved “shocks” in preferences (Anderson, Goeree, 
and Holt, 1999). Experimental evidence suggests that the final equilibrium predicted 
by this theory does not match observed equilibrium conditions too well. Since people 
learn what other people will do, and tend to adjust to it, experimental equilibrium 
values will often deviate from those expected under Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, 
people with different histories and characteristics do not typically attain the same 
common knowledge. Some of the unobserved variation across players could be 
modeled using a probabilistic choice function. However, to complete the 
representation in a repeated game setting, it is necessary to introduce a description of 
the dynamic (cognitive) learning process associated with human choice behavior. 
Game theoretic formulations do not typically include latent variables in the model 
structure to describe individuals’ (or agents’) decision-making processes, under the 
assumption of perfect rationality. In actual games, a player’s decisions will be 
affected by previous payoffs, as well as by current and past actions of competing 
players. The assumptions of perfect rationality and perfect knowledge or information 
under such conditions become difficult to sustain, and bounded rationality becomes a 
more plausible notion in describing the decision-making process and its dependence 
 37 
on individual history. If the player can predict his/her opponent’s action in a game, 
he/she can choose the best action corresponding to the other player’s action. 
Therefore, a player tries to (implicitly) model the opponent’s behavior function based 
on historical data. The existing model framework from classical game theory is 
therefore not sufficient to describe and predict choice behavior under a competitive 
environment, such as repeated auction game situations encountered in electronic 
freight marketplaces. A dynamic strategy choice model is presented in this 
dissertation as a framework to describe players’ choice behavior in such environment. 
 
3.4. Game Theoretic Learning Models 
3.4.1. Introduction 
Since the 1950’s, game theory has became a popular research field among 
economists. Game theory traditionally has been considered to be the theory of 
strategic interactions among players who are perfectly rational, and who exhibit 
equilibrium behavior (Erev, 1998). Game theory, as a part of economic theory, has 
exerted the greatest contribution to design auction mechanisms. Nash equilibrium has 
proven to be a powerful instrument to analyze a player’s perfectly rational behavior. 
As mentioned before, in reality, people do not act in the way postulated by Nash 
equilibrium models. Since the late 1980’s, evolutionary game theory has been studied 
as a means to explain a player’s behaviors in an auction game. This section presents 
the existing mathematical frameworks in evolutionary game theory, and the learning 
assumptions that exist in experimental evolutionary learning models. 
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Several mechanisms have been proposed to explain player’s choice behaviors in 
sequential repeated games. However, most of these perspectives have not been able to 
completely explain the actual time-scale of equilibration in complex games. In a non-
cooperative game, people learn how to play through experience. Consequently, 
evolutionary learning theory is important to understanding equilibration theoretically, 
and to explaining the changes in strategic behavior observed in the lab and in the field. 
In recent years, evolutionary learning theory has been proposed by game theorists 
and experimental economists. They have focused a great deal of their attention on the 
question: how do people learn in repeated games (Nyarko and Schotter, 2002)? The 
goal of this theory is to understand how equilibrium can arise in the long term for 
multiple players who need not to be rational or even conscious decision makers. The 
learning models consider the limitedly-rational player’s adaptive behavior in a game. 
Experimental economists have modeled empirically-observed behavior, based upon 
the foundations of equilibrium theories.  
Arthur (1991), Mookherjee and Sopher (1994), Roth and Erev (1995, 1998), and 
Borgers and Sarin (2000) proposed reinforcement learning models in which people 
learn by looking back at their experiences and seeing what has been successful for 
them in the past. Belief-based models in epistemic learning have been developed by 
several economists: Boylan and El-Gamal (1993), Mookherjee and Sopher (1994, 
1997), Cheung and Friedman (1997), Rankin, Van Huyck, and Battalio (1997), 
Fudenberg and Levine (1998), and Nyarko and Schotter (2002). They focused on a 
player’s epistemic learning behavior and assumed that beliefs are updated by their 
opponent’s future actions. Furthermore, Camerer and Ho (1998, 1999, 2002) offered 
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a mixed model based upon both reinforcement and belief-based models. In the next 
sections, those experimental learning models are reviewed.  
3.4.2. Belief-based Models 
Belief-based models are based on the concept of epistemic learning. Belief-based 
models assume that, while past actions and payoffs are observable, beliefs are 
unobservable and, therefore, must be represented by proxies and inferred (Nyarko and 
Schotter, 2002). In a γ-weighted belief model, the weighted average of past action is 
taken as a proxy of beliefs, and all weights are decreased by the ratio of γ (Rankin, 
Van Huyck, and Battalio, 1997).  
Boylan and El-gamal (1993) proposed two belief-based models: Cournot5 play and 
fictitious6 play. They then compared the predictions generated by these two models. 
They identified which types of game were consistent with the Cournot and which 
with the fictitious play model. Cheung and Friedman (1997) also developed two types 
                                                 
5 The Cournot adjustment model, first proposed by Augustin Cournot (1838) in the 
context of a duopoly, has players select strategies sequentially. In each period, an 
agent selects the action that is its best response to the action chosen by the competing 
agents in the previous period. Cournot learning can be the extreme form of fictitious 
play in which each firm assumes that its competitor is using the same strategy in 
every period which is equivalent to the one most recently used. (source: 
http://www.gametheory.net/Dictionary/) 
6  A process by which players assume that the strategies of their opponents are 
randomly chosen from some unknown stationary distribution. In each period, a player 
selects her best response to the historical frequency of actions of his/her opponents. 
(source: http://www.gametheory.net/Dictionary/) 
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of play, and compared their two different belief-based models. In addition, they 
developed a more general model, a form of hybrid model, which includes both types 
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where 
)(tB jn : player n ’s  belief about the likelihood that opponent choose action 
ja  in 












 periodin chosen   wasaction  if 1
)(  
u
nγ : the weight given to the observation of action 
ja  in period u  
Fictitious play is the special case, in which γ=1; and Cournot belief is the special 
case in which γ=0. The optimal γ* can be the value of γ that minimizes the distance7 
between stated beliefs 8 ( )(tSB ) and γ-weighted empirical beliefs ( )(tB ) in terms of 
mean square error. 
Nyarko and Schotter (2002) investigated a belief-based learning model. They 
concluded that people behave in a manner consistent with belief learning. 
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8 the true probability assigned to the chosen action until period t  
 41 
Furthermore, they recommended that the types of belief used as inputs to these 
models need to be specified carefully. They found that the outcomes of stated beliefs 
differ from the outcomes of empirical beliefs, since unobserved factors affect the 
player’s choice of behavior. This demonstrates how important it is for the model to 
capture the effect of unobserved interactions between competitors. By transforming 
an unobservable into an observable interaction, we can witness directly how 
parameter estimates change when new information is introduced (Nyarko and 
Schotter, 2002).  
3.4.3. Reinforcement Models 
Belief-based models assume that players hold beliefs about the likelihood of an 
opponent’s action, and assume that the players choose their actions based upon their 
expected payoff, given these beliefs (Feltovich, 2000). On the other hand, 
reinforcement-based models do not require players to formulate any beliefs about 
their opponent’s actions, since players do not have information about their opponents’ 
type or actions. In reinforcement models, their strategies are reinforced relative to the 
payoffs they themselves earn over time, and players adjust their play to maximize 
these payoffs.  
Mookherfee and Sopher (1997) and Erev and Roth (1998) compared the outcomes 
of a belief-based versus a reinforcement model. They found that a reinforcement 
model is better than a belief-based model in describing player behavior within certain 
types of game, even though enough information was given in the belief-based model 
used in their experiment. However, the generality of their results is questionable, 
 42 
since they only used data from their own experiments. 
Sarin and Vahid (1999) conducted experiments to compare two reinforcement 
models. One is the ‘fixed reference point’ model of Erev and Roth (1998), and the 
other their own ‘SV’ model. The SV model assumes that a player chooses whatever 
strategy maximizes their payoffs, given the belief that the payoffs of each strategy are 
equal to the weighted averages of past payoffs.  They concluded that an SV model 
can describe a player’s behavior in a game better than fixed reinforcement models can.  
Sarin and Vahid (1999) suggested a dynamic reinforcement learning model, which 
investigates how a player chooses action each time, given his or her own utility, 
which is updated with the player’s own experience. Each time, players choose the 
strategy that yields the highest payoff. During this process, players ignore all future 
implications of their current choice, in terms of future choices and payoffs (Sarin and 
Vahid, 1999). 
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where  
)(tU jn : reinforcement level of player n  to choose strategy j  at period t  
λ : the proportional rate of player’s surprise to previous reinforcement (0<λ <1) 
                                                 
9 for the case of unchosen strategy at current time (λ =0) 
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)(ϖπ jn : player n  ‘s payoff at period t  from choosing strategy j  given state of world 
(ϖ ) 
In this model, a player does not have information about the true choice 
environment, and does not update his or her subjective reinforcement about the 
payoff provided by other strategies. The above formulation shows that parameter λ  
determines how quickly the reinforcement approaches observed payoffs, and shows 
the effect of observed payoffs on reinforcement levels. 
Sarin and Vahid (1999)’s SV model is similar to a belief-based model (fictitious 
play), since both models are assumed to be myopic, ignoring the implications of 
current choices on future choices and payoffs. One’s beliefs are updated each period 
according to what one observes (Sarin and Vahid, 1999). However, the belief-based 
model assumes that beliefs are probabilistic, by observing the opponent’s actions; 
whereas the SV model is concerned with the player’s own payoffs from previous 
choices.  
3.4.4. Mixed Models 
Camerer and Ho (1998, 1999, 2002) developed a general experimental learning 
model (experience-weighted attraction learning (EWA) model) that incorporates 
elements from both the belief-based and reinforcement models. They illustrated that 
experimental learning models require the specification of initial attractions, how 
attractions are updated by experience, and how choice probabilities depend upon 
attractions. The EWA model assumes that each strategy has a numerical attraction, 
which determines the probability of a player choosing that strategy. In the experience-
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weighted attraction learning model, the attraction value, )(tA ji , 
is updated to be the 
sum of a depreciated experience-weighted previous attraction, )1( −tA ji , plus the 
weighted payoff from period t, normalized by the updated experience weight. 
Therefore, the attraction value and number of experiences are updated over time. The 
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where 
n  and n− : player 
},...,,{ 21 jnnnn sssS = : discrete choice sets (strategy) 
)(tA jn : attraction level of player n  to choose strategy j  at period t  
)(tN : the number of ‘observation-equivalents” of past experience (the unit of  actual 
experience) 
)0(N : the strength of initial attractions, relative to incremental changes in attractions 














nn −π : payoff function of player n  at period t  from choosing j  strategy, 
which depends on the distribution of the opponents’ price, denoted by )( pF i−      
ρ : depreciation rate that measures the fractional impact of previous experience, 
compared to one new period  
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)0(jnA : the initial attraction, which might be derived from similarity between 
strategies and strategies which were successful in similar games or from prior belief 
δ : a discount factor for the payoff of unchosen choice 
φ : a discount factor which depreciate previous attraction 
The EWA model utilizes all the information provided by the players and the game 
environment, which clearly is different than the belief-based and reinforcement 
models. Camerer and Ho (1998, 1999, 2002) showed that belief learning and reinforc
ement learning models are special cases of the EWA model. For this reason, they 
concluded that the EWA model combines both learning models and performs better 
than either of these two alternatives, estimating parameters using maximum 
likelihood estimations. Furthermore, the EWA model appeared to perform better than 
either pure model. However, the EWA model is incomplete, because it does not 
explain how a player’s information about opponents’ payoffs might influence 
decisions. In addition, this model does not capture the unobserved impact of 
competitive environment on bidding behavior and interaction among players’ 
cognitive learning processes. 
 
3.5. Choice Models 
3.5.1. Multinomial Probit Models 
Most previous choice theory models in the transportation field have utilized the 
multinomial logit (MNL) form. Two specific forms were used as the probabilistic 
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choice rule in most of the previously-mentioned studies on learning: exponential 
(logit) and power. Although multinomial logit models have the extreme advantage of 
having a choice probability with a simple closed form, which can be calculated easily, 
the models nonetheless are limited by being ‘independent of irrelevant alternatives’ 
(IIA). In order to overcome this problem, the generalized extreme value model (Train, 
1986), the heteroscedastic extreme value model (Bhat, 1995), and the multinomial 
probit model (MNP) have been considered, and these models allow for a more 
flexible correlation structure of the error term, which is assumed to be normally 
distributed.   
Among them, the MNP model provides the general framework to allow for 
interdependence of alternatives, with the most flexible pattern of error correlation 
structure in discrete choice analysis. Through this assumption, any error correlation 
can be postulated to capture the dynamic aspects of individual behavior, including 
state dependence, contemporaneous correlation, and taste variation (Jou, 1994). 
However, the MNP model is limited by computational difficulties associated with the 
evaluation of choice probabilities, including multidimensional normal integrals. The 
dynamic strategy choice model, under conditions of a competitive environment, also 
has multidimensional integrals for the multinomial density function, for which there 
is no closed form solution.  
The dynamic multinomial probit model requires approximation methods to 
estimate parameters. Lerman and Manski (1981) first proposed a simulated maximum 
likelihood method by which to evaluate the multidimensional integrals required by 
the MNP model. A number of approximation methods have been proposed, but most 
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approximation simulators have not been applied widely, because their results have not 
been accurate enough to satisfy empirical researchers.  
Since the late 1980s, there have been steady advances in multinomial probit 
estimations (McFadden, 1989; Lam and Mahmassani, 1990; Bunch, 1991; Bolduc 
and Ben-Akiva, 1991; Bolduc, 1992; Geweke et al, 1994). McFadden (1989) 
proposed an efficient approximation method for multinomial probit applications, 
which exhibited computational efficiency in seeking model parameters. Lam and 
Mahmassani (1990) proposed a new MNP model estimation program, using a VMC 
(vectorized Monte Carlo) simulation procedure and new implementation of quasi-
Newton BFGS (Broyden-Fletcher-Goldfarb-Shanno) nonlinear procedures to handle 
the large numbers of choice alternatives and general specifications. This estimation 
program has been applied successfully to dynamic travel behavior models with up to 
17 alternatives (Mahmassani and Jou, 1996). Bunch (1991) simplified the 
multinomial probit model’s covariance matrix; and Bolduc (1992) used auto-
regressive errors for the multinomial probit estimation method with a large choice set, 
by means of simplifying its covariance matrix. Geweke et al (1994) proposed using a 
method of simulated moments, or alternatively using simulated maximum likelihood 
estimators with the GM recursive probability simulator, in order to estimate 
multinomial probit model parameters. Recently, Liu and Mahmassani (2000) 
presented a GAMNP model that incorporates genetic algorithms (GAs) and nonlinear 
programming (NLP) techniques to achieve a global optimum in maximum likelihood 
estimation.   
The numerous improvements in the estimation algorithms and the simplification of 
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the covariance matrix both encourage the application of multinomial probit models 
more broadly in the field, because they are fundamentally more flexible than the 
multinomial logit model. Therefore, the MNP model estimation program is applied to 
the estimation of dynamic competitive strategy choice model, and these estimation 
procedures are discussed further in Chapter 4. 
3.5.2. Mixed Logit Models 
Multinomial probit models have long been considered infeasible, because 
calculating the choice probabilities requires the evaluation of multiple integrals with 
no simple closed form solutions; in addition, their flexibility in the MNP model 
comes at a cost. Recent studies have shown that the mixed logit probability simulator 
can be one of the solutions to overcome problems in the MNP model, by means of an 
easy-to-compute and unbiased simulator. Adding the i.i.d. Gumbel term to the normal 
error terms leads to a particularly convenient and attractive probability simulator, 
which is the average of a set of logit probabilities.  The mixed logit or kernel logit 
probability simulator has all of the desirable advantages of a simulator, which include 
being convenient, unbiased and smooth (Ben-Akiva, Bolduc, and Walker, 2001). 
The mixed logit model was introduced both by Boyd and Mellman (1980) and by 
Cardell and Dunbar (1980). A more general model structure was required for the 
smooth probability simulators used in estimating mixed logit models. Since 1980, 
several papers have been published investigating various aspects of the mixed logit 
model, such that the model has become extremely popular in the literature (see 
McFadden 1989; Bolduc and Ben-Akiva 1991; Stern 1992; Bolduc, Fortin and 
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Fournier 1996; Bhat 1997 and 1998; Train 1998; Brownstone and Train 1999; 
Brownstone, Bunch and Train 2000; Goett, Hudson, and Train 2000; Srinivasan and 
Mahmassani 2000; Walker 2001 and 2004;  and Srinivasan and Mahmassani 2005). It 
has been used in a wide variety of application areas. 
Train (1998) and Bhat (1999) applied mixed logit formulation to capture 
heterogeneity in behavior across decision-makers for recreational demand and joint 
mode and departure time choice behaviors. These researchers demonstrated that the 
kernel logit model with normal errors is a more general form of mixed logit model, 
which can combine Gumbel errors with multivariate normal distributions (McFadden 
and Train 2000). This kernel logit model can be more flexible and realistic than the 
probit model, with fewer computational costs; it also allows for various model 
specifications.  
While the number of logit kernel applications has been growing rapidly in the 
literature, the identification issue largely has been ignored.  Recently, Ben-Akiva, 
Bolduc, and Walker (2001, 2004) presented a general framework for the specification, 
identification, and estimation of the logit kernel model. Srinivasan and Mahmassani 
(2003, 2005) also investigated the theoretical foundation of the dynamic kernel logit 
model.  
A few investigators have applied the dynamic kernel logit model to longitudinal, 
discrete-choice data (Revelt and Train 1998; Goett, Hudson, and Train 2000). 
Srinivasan and Mahmassani (2005) utilized the dynamic kernel logit method to model 
longitudinal, discrete-choice data. They derived a dynamic kernel logit (DKL) 
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formulation with normal errors for unordered discrete choice panel data. In addition, 
they presented the theoretical identification, suitability and properties of the kernel 
logit model, as well as the computational efficiency of DKL model performance. In 
this dissertation, the mixed logit model estimation procedure is applied for the 
dynamic strategy choice model under competitive environment. We compare those 
results to estimation results provided by the multinomial probit model in Chapters 6 
and 7. 
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Chapter 4. Research Methodology 
4.1. Introduction 
This dissertation is about the learning models used to describe a player’s strategy 
choice behavior using experimental data. Our goal has been to explain, as accurately 
as possible and for every choice in an experiment, how that choice arises from the 
nature of multi-player interactions and their dynamics over multiple bids. Therefore, 
the principal focus of this dissertation is how to model a player’s dynamic strategy 
choice behavior under the pressure of competition. We are most interested in which 
models describe human behavior best, when players make repeated decisions along 
with or in response to competitors’ decisions. We propose a general dynamic strategy 
choice model framework and estimate the model parametrically, using two sets of 
experimental data.  
This chapter presents the dynamic strategy choice modeling methodology to 
represent the dynamics of bidders’ behavior and their learning processes in auction-
based electronic freight marketplaces. As discussed previously, players in non-
cooperative and competitive games try to assimilate a certain amount of feedback 
information concerning their opponents’ bidding behavior, as they take part in similar 
auction games in a particular electronic market environment. This feedback 
information is an important factor in players’ decision-making processes. Previous 
studies of dynamic choice behavior have not generally considered these interactions 
and associated dynamics among individuals in relation to the decision-making 
process. Introducing this concept of competition impact into dynamic choice model 
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structures is this study’s principal contribution to the development of a new 
perspective on transportation behavior modeling in competitive environments.  
The modeling methodology refutes the generic assumptions of perfect player 
rationality and common knowledge. Different players may exhibit varying types or 
“degrees” of rationality, which depend on how much information feedback they 
receive, and their own experience. Between the two extremes of eductive and 
evolutionary learning mechanisms, this study explores two intermediate dynamic 
processes: the epistemic and behavioral reinforcement learning processes. As noted in 
the previous section, the epistemic process assumes that boundedly rational players 
revise incomplete beliefs about their opponents’ behavior, while the behavioral 
reinforcement process assumes that players with bounded rationality choose flexible 
strategies in response to their own past results (Walliser, 1998). Two different types 
of dynamic strategy choice model structures are developed, one for each dynamic 
learning process considered.  
The epistemic and behavioral reinforcement models have been treated as 
fundamentally different since 1950. Recently, a few researchers have asked whether 
the two learning models are related, based on the belief that people do not always 
apply the same learning process to every game. For this reason, two mixed learning 
models are formulated to explain the player’s mixed learning behavior. The epistemic 
and behavioral reinforcement learning models are special cases of the mixed learning 
model that incorporate both kinds of information.   
The dynamic multinomial probit (DMNP) and dynamic mixed logit (DML) 
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models are applied in this dissertation to provide the mathematical framework for 
modeling bidders’ dynamic strategy decisions. The DMNP and DML frameworks can 
be formulated for general discrete choice situations and can incorporate alternative 
behavioral theories, such as random utility maximization and bounded rationality. A 
key advantage of the DMNP and DKL model frameworks is that it allows flexible 
model specifications and realistic correlation structures for the analysis of dynamic 
discrete choices obtained from panel data. Of particular concern in this study is the 
effect of competition on multiple players’ bidding behavior. Accordingly, new 
DMNP and DML model structures are developed to capture players’ behavior in a 
competitive environment over time, including their reaction to the competitors’ 
bidding strategy. DMNP and DML model framework for dynamic decisions in 
competitive environments is introduced next.  The general structure of research 
methodology is illustrated in Figure 4.1.  
The next section presents the general discrete choice model formulation used to 
compare the new model frameworks. In Section 4.3, the model specifications of 
epistemic learning and behavioral reinforcement learning are described. Section 4.4 
shows the dynamic error structure used to represent the competitive interaction 
among players in their respective choice behaviors. The DMNP and DML model 
estimation procedures are discussed in Sections 4.5 and 4.6. Section 4.7 discusses the 
overall maximum likelihood estimation procedures for both models. In Section 4.8, 





















Figure 4.1 Overall structure of research methodology 
 
4.2. General Discrete Choice Model Formulation 
Consider a player n , Nn ,...,1=  where N  is the number of players included in the 
sample, facing a set 
nC of nJ  discrete choice alternatives, denoted by i , nJi ,...,1= ; 
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nU :  the utility of alternative i  as perceived by individual n  
it
nZ : a ( K×1 ) vector of explanatory variables for the utility to individual n  of 
alternative i , including alternative specific dummy variables, as well as alternative 
specific attributes and individual characteristic variables 
β : ( 1×K ) vector of coefficients 
it















nE : covariance reflecting serial correlation over time periods 
The assumption that the disturbances are multivariate normal distributed results in 
the probit and mixed logit model forms for the choice probability. With this 
specification, the general choice probability of alternative i  for individual n  is given 
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where 
it
nd : a binary indicator of whether the condition in parentheses holds. 
This general DMNP and DML models are extended to develop the dynamic 
strategy choice model under a competitive environment.  
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4.3. Model Specification 
This study develops the dynamic strategy choice model under a competitive 
environment, which captures players’ behavior for both epistemic and behavioral 
reinforcement learning processes of four types of cognitive learning behavior 
introduced in Chapter 2. The model specifications for both cognitive learning models 
are described in this section and investigate how players’ bidding reaction or behavior 
can differ according to the players’ cognitive capacities. The utility in the epistemic 
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where 
ℑ : finite set of player = {1,2,…,n} 
n  and m : player, ℑ∈mn,   
n− : opponent player 
h , i , j  and k : alternative, nCkjih ∈,,,  
t : the time period when shipment r  arrives and it is auctioned; auction epochs 
rT ={ qttt ,...,, 21 } 
it
nU : the utility of player n  to choose alternative i  at time (game) t  
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it
nV : the deterministic term of the utility for player n  at time (game) t  for alternative 
i  
it
nε : the normal error term component of the utility of alternative i  at time (game) t  
to player n   
β : ( 1×K ) vector of coefficients on explanatory variables 
Iβ : the coefficient on initial utility at time (game) period t =0 
i
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: the probability of player n ’s belief about choices i  
of others n−  at time (game) period t  
)(tN in : the number of past auction participating experience about the choice i  of 
player n  at time (game) period t  
 
If the player knows the other player’s previous choice, his/her bidding decision can 
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be affected by the player’s belief regarding the opponent’s choice. This model 
assumes that players would prefer a choice which has high expected payoffs, given 
beliefs formed by observing the history of what others did (Camerer and Ho, 1999). 
Players keep track of others’ history from previous play, and form a function of 
player’s belief about the opponent type on that game. Beliefs are updated by summing 
the previous number of experiences and one for the strategy combination the other 
players choose. The expected payoff value over time is achieved by multiplying that 
belief value for all strategies by payoffs at that time corresponding to a player’s 
choice.  
The following Figure 4.2 presents the conceptual framework for epistemic learning. 
 
Source: Cheung and Friedman, 1997 
Figure 4.2 Conceptual decision framework for epistemic learning  













The other cognitive learning model considered in this study is the behavioral 
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))(( ts innπ : a payoff when player n  choose alternative i  at time (game) period t  
If a player does not have information about another player’s history of decisions, 
he/she could only make a choice based on his/her experience. The reinforcement 
allows that player’s choice decision to be directly reinforced by the previous results, 
and the propensity to opt for choice i  depends on its stock of choice reinforcement 
(Arthur, 1991). The behavioral reinforcement learning model does not capture the 
direct impact of another player’s decision on player own decision because he/she does 
not have records of another player’s previous decisions over time. Based on the 
player’s payoff over time periods, he/she can decide which alternative to choose. 
The initial value ( Iβ ) is included in both learning model specifications, and it 
reflects the influence of prior experience based upon a theory of first-period play and 
the player’s own preference. This initial value can be estimated from the data. Our 
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procedure is more general, because we estimate initial values as part of an overall 
maximization of utility. 
Both epistemic and behavioral reinforcement model specifications include the 
internal habit persistence term, which is composed of two terms: 1) previous 
deterministic utility ( )1( −tV in ); and 2) serial correlations ( 2ρ ) in the error term (see 
Section 4.4). Habit persistence is the relative weight given to the lagged utility in 
epistemic and behavioral reinforcement models. In this dissertation, the habit 
persistence term depends upon the history of past actions, and measures the 
sensitivity of the stock of habit to current action. In general, as the preference for 
future expected payoffs increases, the preference for habit persistence10 decreases.  
The conceptual decision framework for behavioral reinforcement learning is 
described in Figure 4.3. 
                                                 
10  Braun, Constantidines and Ferson (1993) consider internal habit persistence 
specified in difference with one lag in action. More specifically, we assume that 









Figure 4.3 Conceptual decision framework for behavioral reinforcement learning 
  
4.4. Dynamic Error Structure 
In the model framework, the random utility term ( itnε ) is made up of two 
components. The first component has been introduced in the probit disturbance term 
with a multivariate distribution, and it captures the interdependencies among the 
alternatives and shows the effect of serial correlation over time periods. The other 
error component captures the unobserved effect of players’ competition with other 
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nE γ=ΩΩ : the covariance across players when player n choose alternative i  
and player m  choose alternative j   
The general MNP error term ( it
nv ) captures unobserved preference heterogeneity 
across alternatives and serial correlation over time periods. The new error term ( itnΩ ) 
indicates the unobserved impact of player’s decision behavior against the 
competitor’s decision and it is specified as follows: 
ijt
nmγ  for mn ≠                                                                                                            (4.8) 
Table 4.1 below shows the variance-covariance matrix in the case of two players, 
two alternatives, and two time (game) periods. 
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Table 4.1 Var-Cov Matrix for 2 players, 2 alternatives, and 2 time periods case 
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The summary of the error structure for dynamic strategy choice behavior is shown 














































Figure 4.4 Summary of error structure for dynamic strategy choice behavior 
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4.5. Dynamic Multinomial Probit Model 
Assuming that each player n  chooses the set of four bid price alternatives i , 
DMNP model formulations for both dynamic learning models are based upon linear-
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),0(~ ∑ vitn MVNv  
),0(~ ∑Ω γMVNitn  
The random term ( it
nε ) is assumed to be jointly normally distributed, over time, 
and across different alternatives and individuals, with a zero mean and a general 
covariance matrix. itnε  is composed of MTMT ×  (where M = the number of 
alternative (bid prices) and T = the number of games (time periods) matrices that 
capture the correlations across alternatives, serial correlations due to the persistence 
of unobservable attributes across the sequence of games, and unobserved competitive 
influences on bidding behavior among individuals. One structure of the variance-


























nE γ=ΩΩ : the covariance across players when player n choose alternative i  
and player m  choose alternative j   
It can also be written as follow for the special case of Player 1’s error structure 
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In choice theory, the matter for choosing between two alternatives is the difference 
in utility between alternatives. Evaluating the log-likelihood function requires 
calculating the joint probability over all individuals in the sample associated with the 
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chosen alternative. We need to derive the utilities into differences, with respect to the 
utility of the chosen alternative, so as to compute the joint choice probability 
simulator. Each time, we use the chosen alternative as the base. With this restriction, 
if alternative 3 is chosen, then the utility from alternative 3 is greater than the utility 
from alternatives 1, 2, and 4. Parameter β  and the parameters in itnε  are not 
separately identified from observed choice behavior. Considering m  alternatives to 




















































































...                                                                                 (4.12) 
The general utility formulation is written in deviation with respect to the utility of 
the chosen alternative. The Cholesky decomposition formulation of the error term is 
derived to impose a positive definite error covariance matrix. 
With the above error term and utility specifications, the joint choice probability 
( ( )θtinit dd ',....,Pr 1 ) of alternative i  for individual n  is given by the following DMNP 
formula: 
( ) { }0)( ,....,0)(Pr,....,Pr '''' 1111 ≤−≤−= tintjntinitjtittinit UUdUUddd θ                              (4.13) 
)  ,  ,,,,( '''' jiandjiCjjii n ≠∀≠∀∈  
where 
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i  and 'i : chosen alternative 
j  and 'j : unchosen alternative 
),( Eβθ = : the joint vector of parameters 
β : the vector of unknown parameters in the systematic portion of the utility  













The difficulty with the DMNP model is that the resulting choice probabilities are 
multiple integrals. To solve this problem, the following DMNP estimation procedure 
is applied, using the Monte Carlo Simulation method.  
First, make D  draws of dε  from the normal density; this process then is repeated 
D  times. Second, calculate the joint choice probability ( ( )θtinit dd ',....,Pr 1 ). The results 
of D  draws are averaged to calculate the value of the log-likelihood function. 


























εεθ                                                  (4.14) 
The estimation method considered is based upon the maximization of the natural 
logarithm of the simulated likelihood function. The simulated log-likelihood function 
is written as:  
( )θβ tinit ddEL ',....,Prln),(log 1
^^^
=                                                                              (4.15) 
Once the simulated joint probabilities are obtained, the parameters in the above 
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DMNP model structure can be estimated using maximum likelihood. Those 
procedures are described in the Section 4.7 of this chapter. 
 
4.6. Dynamic Mixed Logit Model 
The multinomial probit (MNP) structure allows flexibility in the error structure for 
the covariance among the unobserved attributes of the alternatives. Unfortunately, in 
most choice contexts, the increase in flexibility of the MNP structure comes at the 
prohibitive cost of evaluating very high-dimensional multivariate normal integrals for 
choice probabilities. Over the past few years, researchers have discovered that 
simulation techniques, using a mixed or kernel logit model, can approximate the 
multi-dimensional integrals with smooth, unbiased and efficient simulators (Ben-
Akiva et al, 2001). 
The dynamic mixed logit model presented here is extended to consider mixed error 
structures, such as mixed or kernel logit variants of the MNP. This framework 
combines the flexibility and realism of the probit structure with some of the 
computational simplicity of the logit model. With the mixed logit framework, 
unobserved disturbance terms for each alternative can be divided into two 
components: a multivariate normally-distributed error component in the MNP, and a 
Gumbel-distributed error component in the MNL framework.  
Gumbel error terms are assumed to be independent and identical over times, as 
well as across alternatives and individuals in the MNL model. Limitations in the i.i.d 
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Gumbel error term in MNL can be overcome by mixing the variance and covariance 
structure of the error term in MNP. Therefore, the Gumbel error terms in a mixed 
logit model can provide computational flexibility, by exploiting the closed logit-
likelihood functional form, conditional upon the MVN error terms (Srinivasan and 
Mahmassani, 2005). The unconditional probability of choosing alternatives can be 
obtained by integrating the logit probability over the MVN error terms, by means of 
Monte Carlo integration. In this section, we discuss the calibration procedure for the 
dynamic mixed logit model. We develop the model formulation in the context of the 
model of a player’s bid price choice. We use the same structures of utility 
specification and error structure for both cognitive learning processes as in the above 
DMNP model.  
Assume M  bid price choices, N individuals, and T time periods (games) in the 
choice set. Let the utility itnU  that an individual associates with the bid price choice 
alternative be the sum of a deterministic component itnV  that depends upon observed 
attributes of the alternative, as well as an individual and random component. In this 
discrete choice model, the utility that player n, n = 1,..., N,  where N is the sample size, 




















n vVVEVU ηηε +Ω++=++=+=                                              (4.16) 
The random vectors  it
nv  and 
it
nΩ  are assumed to be mutually independent, and 
independent of itnη . The 
it
nη  terms are assumed to be independent and identically 
standard-Gumbel distributed across alternatives and individuals. In general, the 
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dynamic mixed logit model accommodates a flexible covariance structure across 
alternatives and times. In our case, the dynamic mixed logit model can allow different 













n v Ω+=ε  for mn ≠  
),0(~ ∑ vitn MVNv  
),0(~ ∑Ω γMVNitn  
),0(...~ ∑ ηη Gumbeldiiitn  
The random terms ( itnε ) are assumed to be jointly, normally distributed, over time 
periods, alternatives and individuals, with a zero mean and a general covariance 
matrix. The itnε  matrices capture correlations across alternatives, serial correlations 
due to the persistence of unobservable attributes across the sequence of games, and 
unobserved competitive influences on bidding behavior among individuals, as in the 
above DMNP model. A structure of the variance-covariance matrix in the error term 


























nE γ=ΩΩ : the covariance across players when player n choose alternative i  
and player m  choose alternative j   
For given values of itnv  and 
ijt
nγ  in the DML model, we get the familiar MNL form 



































nE ηε +=                                          (4.18) 
Since it
nε  is not known, the unconditional probability of choosing alternative i now 
can be obtained by integrating the conditional multinomial choice probabilities in 
equation (4.18) with respect to the assumed normal and independent distributions for 























































)(),()(                     (4.19) 
where )( itnf ε  is the joint density function of 
it







n v Ω+=ε  for mn ≠                                                                                          (4.20) 
For the maximum likelihood estimate, the probability of each sampled individual's 




































εεεε                                        (4.21) 
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εεεεεεεε )(),()(),()(                            (4.22) 
With the above error term and utility specifications, the joint choice probability 
among individuals, based upon the above probability of each sampled individual's 
sequence of observed choices over time of alternative i , is given by: 
( ) { }0)( ,....,0)(Pr,....,Pr '''' 1111 ≤−≤−= tintjntinitjtittinit UUdUUddd θ                            (4.23) 
)  ,  ,,,,( '''' jiandjiCjjii n ≠∀≠∀∈  
We rewrite this joint probability for DML model as: 




































εεεε                                  (4.24) 
where 
i  and 'i : chosen alternative 
j  and 'j : unchosen alternative 
),( Eβθ = : the joint vector of parameters  
β : the vector of unknown parameters in the systematic portion of the utility  

























εεεε )(),Pr()Pr(                                                                              (4.25) 
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We assume a linear-in-parameter specification for the systematic utility of each 
choice alternative, given by itn
it
n ZV β=  for individual n and alternative i. The 
















nΩ  and 
it
nη  each are 
independently and identically distributed.  
The purpose of estimation is to obtain model parameters by maximizing the 
likelihood function over all individuals in the sample. The parameters to be estimated 
in the DML model are the parameter vectors β  in the systematic portion of utility, 
the variance-covariance matrix vΣ  and the variance-covariance matrix γΣ . The 
Cholesky decomposition formulation of the error term is derived to impose a positive 
definite error covariance matrix. Then, the log-likelihood function for a given value 









































ln)Pr(ln)(                                    (4.26) 
Unfortunately, the log-likelihood function for the estimate of the parameters 
involves a multi-dimensional integral, which must be evaluated numerically, since it 
does not have a closed-form solution. The Monte Carlo simulation technique is 
applied to approximate the choice probabilities in the log-likelihood function of 
equation (4.26), by taking draws of ),( Eβθ =  from the population density and 
calculating the joint probability among individuals over time, and then maximizing 
 75 
the resulting simulated log-likelihood function. The average of  ),Pr( itn
it
ni −εε  over D 
























: the simulated joint choice probability among individuals choosing alternative 
i  given parameter vector  θ  
( )ditnitn −εε , : the dth realization of Monte-Carlo draws from the multi-variate normal 
distribution   
This simulated joint probability is an unbiased estimator; and we expect that, as 
the number of draws (D) increases, the variance will decrease. This variance is 
smooth and sums to one over all alternatives (Train, 2003). The simulated log-
likelihood of the sample is the sum of the natural logarithm of the simulated joint 


























ln)Pr(ln)( εεθ                                                           (4.28) 
The above simulation technique approximates the joint choice probabilities. Since 
the elements within the vectors it




nΩ  and 
it
nη  are independent of 
each other, we generate a matrix it
nε  of standard normal random numbers, and 
compute the corresponding joint choice probabilities for a given value of the 
parameter vector θ . The process is repeated D times for a given value of the 
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parameter vector θ . The parameter vector θ  is estimated as the vector value that 
maximizes the above-simulated function.  
The maximum simulated log-likelihood (MSL) estimator has been considered to 
be simulated loglikelihood estimators, which is consistent, asymptotically efficient, 
and asymptotically normally distributed (Hajivassiliou, McFadden, and Ruud 1996; 
Lee 1992). The bias of the MSL estimator can be decreased, as the number of D 
draws increases. In the current study, we use 3000 repetitions for accurate simulations 
of the choice probabilities, and to reduce simulation variance of the MSL estimator. 
 
4.7. Maximum  Likelihood  Estimation Process for Epistemic and Behavioral 
Reinforcement Learning Models 
The general structure of the DMNP and DML models parameter estimation 
procedure is illustrated in Figure 4.5. The procedure shows the iterative approach to 
search for the maximum likelihood estimates. The likelihood function is evaluated 
each iteration, and the process is terminated when the specific convergence criterion 
is achieved (Jou and Mahmassani, 1994). The probit and mixed logit probability 
functions consist of multi-dimensional integrals that do not have closed-form 
solutions, and must be approximated numerically. Therefore, the Monte Carlo 
Simulation is applied to evaluate the both DMNP and DML choice probabilities. All 
estimations and computations are carried out using the FORTRAN programming 
language.  
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Model Specification Collect the Data Sets
Input








MNP and ML Choice
 
Source: Lam and Mahmassani (1991) 
Figure 4.5 General Model Estimation Procedure  
As mentioned earlier, the new DMNP model framework is presented to develop 
the dynamic strategy choice models for bidding behavior. To introduce competitive 
behaviors between players into the model estimation process, the following maximum 
likelihood parameter estimation process is described: 
 
Step 1. Take the attribute sets and each individual’s chosen alternative as inputs 
and specify the model structure. 
Step 2. Specify the error structure to provide the error matrices for each 
individual. 
1) Draw values of two error components from a normal density with a 
zero mean and covariance.  
2) Apply the initial values for the parameters and the variance-
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covariance terms. 






n v Ω+=ε      







n εεε −=  
where i  = the chosen alternative at time t , and  j  = the unchosen 
alternative at time t . 
2) Provide the Cholesky decomposition matrix 
Step 4. Use the configured error structure to generate realizations for the error 
components of the utilities. 
Step 5. Calculate the deterministic utility values ( itnV ) 







n VVV −=  
where, i : the chosen alternative at time t , and j : the unchosen 
alternative at time t . 
Step 7. Monte Carlo Simulation  
1) Using those values of errors and deterministic utility, calculate the 






n VU ε+=  
2) Provide the joint choice probability, which is the likelihood of a 
sequence of decisions over all players and time periods: 
( ) { }0)( ,....,0)(Pr,....,Pr '''' 1111 ≤−≤−= tintjntinitjtittinit UUdUUddd θ                       
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)  ,  ,,,,( '''' jiandjiCjjii n ≠∀≠∀∈  
3) Perform the Monte Carlo simulation until the choice probabilities of 
alternatives for each observation converge to steady values. 
Step 8. Sum the probabilities of the chosen alternatives, which are the 
proportion of draws that are accepted:  



























Step 9. Determine the next direction and step-size using the BFGS (Broyden-
Fletcher-Goldfarb-Shanno) quasi-Newton algorithm with a central 
difference gradient to increase the non-linear likelihood function value 
(Jou and Mahmassani, 1994). 
Step 10. Repeat the above steps until the convergence criterion is achieved. 
In addition, the new DML model framework is explored to develop dynamic 
strategy choice models for the bidding behavior. The maximum likelihood parameter 




Same as in DMNP model estimation procedure  
Step 7. Monte Carlo Simulation  
1) Using the values of errors and deterministic utility, calculate the total 






n VU ε+=  
2) Provide the joint choice probability, which is the likelihood of a 
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sequence of decisions for all players over all time periods: 











































3) Perform Monte Carlo simulations until the choice probabilities of the 
alternatives for each observation converge to steady values. 
Step 8. Sum the joint probabilities of the chosen alternatives, which is the 



















)(Pr εε  
Step 
9~10. 
Same as in DMNP model estimation procedure 
The following Figure 4.6 shows the overall estimation procedure for the dynamic 
strategy choice model. 
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Step 1: Read the input data sets
Step 2: Provide the Var-Cov Matrix
Step 3: Reduce the Dimension of
Var-Cov Matrix
Cholesky Matrix
Step 4: Generate the Value of
 the Error Term Parameters
Step 5: Calculate the Deterministic Utility
Values
Step 6: Reduce the Dimension of
Deterministic Utility Values
Step 7: Provide the Utility of each alternative
Monte Carlo Simulation Process
Step 8: Estimate the Joint Choice Probability
 
Figure 4.6 General Maximum Likelihood Parameter Estimation Procedures 
 
4.8. Mixed Learning Model Specification and Estimation Process  
We investigate two cognitive learning models in Section 4.1. These model 
specifications differ according to the level of cognitive capacity used for the given 
information. In this process, we expect that players make a decision based on their 
cognitive learning beliefs in sequential games. However, we question whether players 
continuously keep their learning beliefs for all games, if these players have enough 
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information for epistemic learning game. People are not always rational when making 
decisions; hence, their decisions vary depending on the learning process for each 
game. Since players can change their beliefs or learning process based on their 
payoffs and their cognitive capacity, the player’s strategy for each game can change 
with the corresponding either or both of cognitive learning process. This is called as 
the mixed learning process. Therefore, we propose the mixed learning model 
estimation procedure in this section and then estimate the model parametrically using 
epistemic learning datasets in Chapters 6 and 7. 
The mixed learning model combines elements of two learning approach by 
including them as special cases. One approach is the epistemic learning model, which 
assumes that players keep track of the history of previous plays by others and form 
beliefs about what others will do based on past observation (Camerer and Anderson, 
2000).  Players make a best-response decision and expect that this strategy will 
maximize their expected payoff. In contrast, the behavioral reinforcement learning 
model assumes that strategies are reinforced by previous payoffs, and the propensity 
to choose a strategy depends on its reinforcement (Camerer and Anderson, 2000). 
Players care only about past payoffs, not about the mixed choice strategy of play that 
created those payoffs.  
For a long time, researchers thought that these two approaches could not be 
combined since they rely on different cognitive capacity and information. Recently, 
however, some researchers have explored how the approaches might be related. The 
epistemic learning model does not consider the effect of past successes of chosen 
strategies, and the behavioral reinforcement model does not consider other players’ 
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reactions. Players make sequential decisions that rely on mixed beliefs created by 
their payoffs and the cognitive capacity to review other players’ reactions. Based on 
this, the mixed learning model can combine appropriate elements of the epistemic and 
behavioral reinforcement learning approaches.  
In the epistemic learning model, these mixed strategies, which represent the 
interdependence among players’ choices, build players’ beliefs about competitors’ 
choices. The mixed learning model assumes that the player’s decision is affected by 
competitors’ learning beliefs, which decide the competitor’s strategy.  Therefore, 
mixed learning model structures are specified to provide each player’s degree of 
propensity for following the mixed learning process (epistemic and behavioral 
reinforcement).  
This dissertation proposes two mixed learning model structures. As previously 
mentioned, players do not always keep the same learning beliefs about the success or 
failure of a strategy; hence, players do not follow the same learning process in 
sequential games. In addition, players can change their decisions and learning process 
based on other players’ reactions and their learning beliefs. Players can switch the 
strategic learning belief from either of the two learning processes to the other 
(epistemic and behavioral reinforcement). Therefore, two types of mixed learning 
models are formulated that have different assumptions about the interdependence of 
players’ decisions with opponents’ cognitive learning processes. One model makes an 
assumption about the interdependence among cognitive learning processes, while the 
other shows the independence of these processes. 
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We examine these mixed learning structures for parameters with clear 
psychological interpretations using statistical chi-square tests. To test the empirical 
usefulness of the mixed learning model, we derive maximum-likelihood parameter 
estimates from two epistemic learning datasets. The following process shows the first 
type of mixed learning model specification and estimation process. In this mixed 
learning model I, we consider that impact of independence among players’ cognitive 
learning processes related to choice. In other words, the player’s decision is not 
affected by other player’s learning belief, which decides each competitor’s decision. 
Therefore, we calculate each player’s utility for each learning process and then 
provide the joint probability among players. We assume that players do not response 
to other competitor’s cognitive learning belief in order to make a decision; thus, we 
do not consider the mixed strategy associated with the combination of players’ 
cognitive learning processes to provide joint probability. We then verify the degree of 
impact of each learning process on each player’s choice decision in the Monte Carlo 
simulation process. The utility specification for each learning model is same as in 




Same as in the above non-mixed learning model maximum likelihood 
estimation process 




















































































































nVE : player n ’s deterministic utility with epistemic learning rule of 
choice i at game (time) t   
it
nVR : player n ’s deterministic utility with behavioral reinforcement 
learning rule of choice i at game (time) t  
Step 6. Reduce the dimension of the above player n ’s deterministic utility for 














n VRVRVR −=  
where, i : the chosen alternative at time t , and j : the unchosen 
alternative at time t . 
Step 7. Monte Carlo Simulation  
1) Using those values of errors and deterministic utility, calculate the 


















EnUE : player n ’s difference in utility between chosen i  and 
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RnUR : player n ’s difference in utility between chosen i  and 
unchosen j  for behavioral reinforcement learning process at game 
(time) t  for RnD
th draw 
2) Provide the joint choice probability of each learning process among 
players, which is the likelihood of a sequence of decisions over all 
players and time periods. 
 two-player experiment: 




































dddP θ  
)'''' ,''  ,  ,'',',,'',',( jiandjijiCjjjiii n ≠∀≠∀≠∀∈  
where 
it
nU : player n ’s utility with either of epistemic or behavioral 
reinforcement learning rule of choice i  at game (time) t  
i  ,  'i  and ''i : chosen alternative 
j , 'j  and ''j : unchosen alternative 
),( Eβθ = : the joint vector of parameters 
 3) Perform the Monte Carlo simulation until the choice probabilities of 
alternatives for each observation converge to steady values. 
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Step 8. Sum the probabilities of each learning process of the chosen 
alternatives, which are the proportion of draws that are accepted:  



























 Two-player experiment: 

































































































































































































































































DD EE 11 α=  and DDDD
EER )1( 111 α−=−=  for Player 1 
DD EE 22 α=   and DDDD
EER )1( 222 α−=−=  for Player 2 
DD EE 33 α=   and DDDD
EER )1( 333 α−=−=  for Player 3 
 where  
E
nD : player n ’s number of draws for epistemic learning rule 
R
nD : player n ’s number of draws for behavioral reinforcement learning 
rule 
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D : total number of Monte Carlo simulation draws 
 E
nα : parameter value for player  n ’s degree of propensity for the 
epistemic learning process over all games  
E
nα−1 : parameter value for player  n ’s degree of propensity for the 
behavioral reinforcement learning process over all games 
Step 
9~10. 
Same as in the above non mixed learning model maximum likelihood 
estimation process 
The next process presents the second type of mixed learning model specification 
and estimation process. The mixed learning model II considers the impact of 
interdependence among players’ learning rules related to choice decision. Players can 
switch their learning processes or choices according to competitors’ learning beliefs, 
which influence their strategies. Based on this hypothesis, we provide each player’s 
utility and the joint probability for the mixed combination of players’ learning 
processes. In this process, the interdependence impact of the mixed combination of 
learning processes among players can be investigated by providing the sum of the 
partial joint probability for each mixed learning process. The following procedure 




Same as in the above mixed learning model I estimation process 
Step 7. Monte Carlo Simulation  
1) Using those values of errors and deterministic utility, calculate the 
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n VRUR ε+=  
where  
*it
nUE : player n ’s difference in utility between chosen i  and unchosen 
j  for epistemic learning process at game (time) t  for EnD
th draw 
*it
nUR : player n ’s difference in utility between chosen i  and unchosen 
j  for behavioral reinforcement learning rule of choice i  at game (time) 
t   
2) Provide the partial joint choice probability of each combination of 
learning process among players, which is the likelihood of a sequence 
of decisions over all players and time (game) periods.  
Two-player experiment: 
( ) { }0)( ,0)(Pr, '2'22111'21 ' ≤−≤−= titjtiitjtittiit UEUEdUEUEdddPEE θ  
( ) { }0)(,0)(Pr, '2'2'2111'21 ≤−≤−= titjtiitjtittiit URURdUEUEdddPER θ  
( ) { }0)(,0)(Pr, '2'2'2111'21 ≤−≤−= titjtiitjtittiit UEUEdURURdddPRE θ  































































































































































































































































































3) Provide the total joint probability for all combinations of learning 
processes among players 
( ) ( ) ( )
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)'''' ,''  ,  ,'',',,'',',( jiandjijiCjjjiii n ≠∀≠∀≠∀∈  
112121212 =+++
RRREEREE αααα  
1123123123123123123123123 =+++++++
RRRRRERERREEERREREEEREEE αααααααα  
where 
i  ,  'i  and ''i : chosen alternative 
j , 'j  and ''j : unchosen alternative 
),( Eβθ = : the joint vector of parameters 
m
nα : parameter value for player’s degree of propensity for the m  type 
of mixed cognitive learning process over all games 
 
3) Perform the Monte Carlo simulation until the choice probabilities of 
alternatives for each observation converge to steady values. 
Step 8. Sum the probabilities of the chosen alternatives, which are the 
proportion of draws that are accepted:  



























,...., εεθ  
Step 
9~10. 
Same as in the above mixed learning model I estimation process 
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Chapter 5. Explanatory Analysis 
5.1. Introduction 
The previous chapter discussed the research methodology of the current study, 
including the epistemic and behavioral learning modeling frameworks using the 
dynamic multinomial probit (DMNP) and dynamic mixed logit (DML) structure. 
Those model structures were applied to data sets obtained from two experiments in 
which decision-makers are in hypothetical bidding situations. The first experiments 
included two players who separately participated in the two types of games (epistemic 
and behavioral reinforcement) 80 games (times) each, and who were able to choose 
between four discrete alternative bid prices each time. The former type of game 
provided subjects with enough information for behavioral reinforcement, but not 
enough for epistemic learning. The latter game provided subjects with enough 
information for epistemic learning. The first price auction11 was applied to the first 
experiment introduced. 
To extend our modeling structure and evaluate the performance of the dynamic 
strategy choice model, the second experiment is necessary. In these experiments, 
three people play a sequential auction game 80 times with the same opponent under 
                                                 
11 In a procurement auction, the winner is the bidder who submits the lowest bid, and 
is paid an amount equal to his or her bid. (source: http://www.gametheory.net/ 
Dictionary/) 
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various treatments/scenarios. The second price auction12 was applied. The estimation 
results for DML model is provided using the data from this second experiment. Those 
results were compared to the estimation results using the first experiment data.  
Each player was asked to provide a choice decision among the four bid prices for 
the two types of game. For the behavioral reinforcement learning case, players did not 
have information about the opponent’s previous choice; they only knew their own 
history of decisions, and who had won each prior game. In the epistemic learning 
survey, each player was notified after each game about all players’ choices. Players 
were able to track their opponent’s decision history as well their own decisions.  
The rule for winning was that whichever player bid the lower bid price would win 
the game. Each player sustained different costs during each game and his or her 
payoff depended upon the different costs each time, since the payoff was the 
difference between the chosen bid price and the cost at any given time. If both players 
bid the same price, a given player’s payoff is half the difference between the chosen 
bid price and the corresponding cost. The player’s payoff and history of choice 
decision index were used as alternative specific explanatory variables. Estimations 
were performed for epistemic, behavioral reinforcement, and mixed learning models. 
Note that while the decision-makers are professionals, they do not work for freight 
                                                 
12 In a procurement auction, the winner is the bidder who submits the lowest bid, and 
is paid an amount equal to the next lowest submitted bid. (source: http://www. 
gametheory.net/Dictionary/) 
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carriers, nor are their responses intended for any other purpose than to illustrate 
application of the models introduced in this study, and how the parameter values 
would be interpreted in light of the particular specifications of interest. 
In this study, it is assumed that private and public information are the same across 
different games. A player’s cost information only is revealed to the player him or 
herself. Accordingly, the payoff also is private information. 
 
5.2. Input Data Description  
As previously mentioned, the datasets were collected through two experiments 
designed to examine epistemic and behavioral reinforcement learning. The first 
experiment included two players in a first price auction, while the second experiment 
consisted of three players in a second price auction. These data were derived from 
experiments involving 80 repetitions of two games under different informational 
assumptions and payoff structures.  
All games were designed to allow players to choose from four bid prices with 
different assumptions for each of two players.  In each game, each player’s bid price 
and cost determine that player’s payoff. Table 5.1 shows the bid price index as a 
choice alternative. We used a uniform distribution to generate random cost values 
between 10 and 20 for each player. Each player’s costs are different each game, as is 




Table 5.1 Choice set for bid price 
Index Bid Price (BP) 
Alternative 1 10 
Alternative 2 15 
Alternative 3 20 










































Figure 5.2 Players’ costs for each time period (three-player experiment) 
 
Payoff in these games (for players) is a critical factor to determine the player’s 





























π  (5.1) 
where 
it
nπ : player n ’s payoff for choosing the alternative bid price i  at time (game) t  
it
nBP : player n ’s bid price as alternative i  at time (game) t  
t
nCost : player n ’s cost at time (game) t  
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tCost220 −  
Player 2 






The player with the lowest bid price wins the game in the first price auction. For 
the three-player experiment and second price auction, the payoff is determined by the 
second lowest bid and the player’s given cost in that game. Therefore, players in the 
second price auction can expect a greater payoff than the players in the first price 

































nπ : player n ’s payoff for choosing the alternative bid price i  at time (game) t  
it
nSBP : player m ’s bid, which is the second lowest price, as alternative j  at time 
(game) t  
t
nCost : player n ’s cost at time (game) t  
 
5.3. Two-Player Experimental Data Analysis 
Figures 5.3 and 5.4 show the player’s actual frequency of bid price choices for 
two-player experiment, given epistemic learning data. The actual frequency ( )(iF tn ) 















)(                                                                                                 (5.2) 
)(iF tn : the player n ’s actual frequency for choosing alternative bid price i  at time 
(game) t  
)(iN tn : the player n ’s total number of choice for choosing alternative bid price i  at 
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Figures 5.3 and 5.4 illustrate that the actual frequency of bid price 15 for both 
players, using epistemic learning data, is higher than for all alternative choices after 
ten to twenty games (t=10~20). As games are repeated, Player 1’s actual frequency of 
choosing bid price 15 (BP=15) increases relative to the other bid price choices. 
However, as games are repeated, Player 2’s frequency of bid price 10 (BP=10) 
dramatically increases after 40 games (t=40), but the frequency of bid price 15 
(BP=15) remains largely unchanged after 45 games. As mentioned before, the players 
have knowledge about their opponents’ previous choices (actions). Player 2 prefers to 
choose alternative 10 (BP=10) after 40 games, because he or she learned that Player 1 
is more likely to choose bid price 15 (BP=15) than any other choice. These patterns 
are depicted clearly in Figures 5.4 and 5.9. In Figure 5.9, Player 2’s probability of 
winning is increased after 40 games (t=40), since Player 2 chooses the lowest bid 
price 10 more often than any other choices.  
Figure 5.5 presents the players’ probability13 of each alternative over 80 games, 
using the epistemic learning experimental data. The probability of each bid price 
choice for each player shows the player’s bidding strategy and his or her own risk 
management preference. From this perspective of risk management, Player 2 is a 
greater risk taker than Player 1. Player 2 is more likely to choose bid price 20 or 25 
than Player 1, if he or she can have more payoffs.  
 



















































Figure 5.5 Probability of choice over 80 games for epistemic learning (two-player 
experiment) 
 
We estimate a linear regression model, with bid price as the dependent variable, to 
test whether a winning payoff variable has a significant effect on bid price choice. 
The following linear regression structure is examined to show the relationship 
between the chosen bid price and payoffs, if a player wins that game. Table 5.4 




n payoffBP ×+= βα                                                                                              (5.3) 
where 
α : a constant 
β : the coefficient of winning payoff variable 
t
nBP : player n ’s chosen bid price at time (game) t  
t
npayoff : player n ’s payoff at time  (game) t  if player wins that game 
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Table 5.4 Regression results for epistemic learning data (two-player experiment) 
 Player1 Player2 Both 
 B t-value B t-value B t-value 
(Constant) 14.976 40.545 15.061 41.725 15.008 60.535 
Payoff 0.789 5.049 0.753 6.597 0.767 8.637 
R2 0.246 0.358 0.321 
SSE 618.032 799.146 1418.028 
SSR 201.968 445.854 669.472 
SST 820.000 1245.000 2087.500 
 
 
As can be seen from Table 5.4, all variables have significant t-values at a 95% 
confidence level. This means that the winning payoff effect on bid price choice is 
significant. It also shows that Player 2 is more concerned about the winning payoff to 
choose bid price than Player 1, as seen by the R-square value. However, the R-square 
values for goodness of fit are not high enough to explain either player’s bidding 
behavior. In particular, the interaction between players affects each player’s decisions 
in the epistemic learning experiment. This implies that a player cannot choose a bid 
price alternative based upon the winning payoff.  
Figures 5.6 and 5.7 present the actual frequency of bid price choices for the 
behavioral reinforcement experiment data. Figure 5.8 shows the probability of each 
bid price choice across 80 games. In the behavioral reinforcement experiment, players 
only know their own actions. The rank order of Player 1’s frequency of bid price 
choices at the end of sequential games is the same as the corresponding rank order 
observed in the epistemic learning experiment. On the other hand, Player 2 is more 
likely to choose bid price 10 (BP=10) than bid price 15 (BP=15). After 40 games, 
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Player 1 prefers to choose bid price 15 (BP=15), but Player 2 is more likely to choose 
bid price 10 (BP=10). Therefore, Player 2’s winning probability is higher than Player 
1’s winning probability after 40 games (see Figure 5.10).  
As mentioned before, the probability of each bid price choice for each player, 
shown in Figure 5.8, demonstrates each player’s bidding strategy and his or her own 
risk management preference. Player 1 takes greater risks in the behavioral 
reinforcement game than in the epistemic learning game. However, Player 2 behaves 
in a more risk neutral manner, by choosing bid prices 10 and 15 at almost the same 
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Figure 5.6 Player 1’s actual frequency of bid price choice for behavioral 
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Figure 5.7 Player 2’s actual frequency of bid price choice for behavioral 




































A linear regression model, with bid price as the dependent variable, was 
constructed to test whether a winning payoff variable has a significant effect on bid 
price choice. The following linear regression structure, using behavioral 
reinforcement experimental data, shows the relationship between chosen bid price 
and payoff, if a player wins that game (see Table 5.5). 
 
Table 5.5 Regression results for behavioral reinforcement learning data (two-player 
experiment)  
 Player1 Player2 Both 
 B t-value B t-value B t-value 
(Constant) 15.076 46.359 15.088 38.499 15.075 59.653 
Payoff 0.813 7.688 0.928 7.099 0.868 10.434 
R2 0.431 0.393 0.408 
SSE 608.029 843.615 1456.443 
SSR 460.721 545.135 1003.557 
SST 1068.750 1388.750 2460.000 
 
The winning payoff variable has a significant t-value at a 95% confidence level for 
all cases. The R-square value for the behavioral reinforcement game is higher than for 
the epistemic learning game, since players only consider their own payoffs in this 
game. Distinct from the epistemic result, Player 1 is more concerned about the 
winning payoff when choosing bid price than Player 2, as seen by the R-square value.  
Figures 5.9 and 5.10 present players’ winning and tying probabilities for each 
experiment. Table 5.6 shows the number of ties and probability of bid price choices 





























































Figure 5.10 Players’ winning frequency for behavioral reinforcement learning data 
(two-player experiment) 
 
                                                 
14 Winning frequency includes the number of tie game 
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Table 5.6 Frequency of tie for epistemic and behavioral reinforcement learning (two-
player experiment) 
 Epistemic Behavioral Reinforcement 
Bid Price # of Tie % # of Tie % 
10 8 27.6 14 38.9 
15 19 65.5 17 47.2 
20 2 6.9 5 13.9 
25 0 0.0 0 0.0 
total 29 100.0 36 100.0 
 
As a player chooses a lower bid price, a player achieves less as a payoff. In the 
epistemic learning experiment, each player knew who had chosen which bid price 
after each game. Accordingly, each player was very sensitive to the other’s actions. 
The probability of a tie is less in the epistemic learning game than in the behavioral 
reinforcement learning game (see Figures 5.9 and 5.10, and Table 5.6). This implies 
that, in the epistemic learning game, players choose different bid prices, because 
players can predict other player’s actions. For this reason, the number of ties with bid 
price 15 (BP=15) is much higher than the other choices in the epistemic learning 
game (see Table 5.6). In the behavioral reinforcement experiment, players cannot 
predict the other player’s actions; they only know the opponent’s choice if they bid 
the same price. Therefore, ties occur with bid prices 10 and 15 more often than with 




5.4. Three-Player Experimental Data Analysis 
The second experiment was conducted to evaluate the performance of the dynamic 
strategy choice model. In these experiments, three players attended 80 games, most of 
which were the same as in the first experiment (except for the price award 
assumption). Players were notified that the game winner would receive a payoff 
based not on their bidding price but on the second lowest bid. We expected that 
players in this second price auction would bid lower than the players in the first price 
auction. Accordingly, the player’s reaction against other competitors’ strategies 
should differ compared to the players’ behavior in the first price auction. In addition, 
it was difficult for players to determine their bid, since players did not know their true 
value of their choice. In classic second price auctions, players often fail to adjust their 
value estimates to the information revealed by winning; hence, players have less 
confidence in their understanding of the auction and prefer to avoid behavior that 
appears extreme (Kagel, 1995). Under such conditions, the results of this second 
experiment should differ from those of the first experiment. The following analysis 
for the three-player experiment demonstrates each player’s preference for each 
strategy and their bidding behavior for each cognitive learning process. 
Figures 5.11 through 5.13 show the player’s actual frequency of bid price choices, 
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Figure 5.13 Player 3’s actual frequency of bid price choice for epistemic learning data 
(three-player experiment) 
 
Figures 5.11 through 5.13 show that the actual frequency of bid price 15 (BP=15) 
for all players is higher than for other choices after 10 to 25 games (t=10–25). The 
rank order of bidding frequency at the end of sequential games is the same as the 
corresponding order observed in the two-player experiment. As games repeated, the 
actual frequency of choosing bid price 15 (BP=15) among all players increased 
relative to the other bid price choices. In particular, this bid was a dominant choice 
for Players 2 and 3 in all games. Players’ payoffs for bidding a price of 10 was mostly 
negative, since the given cost range was between 10 and 20. Players could not take 
the risk of bidding 10, even in the second price auction game, since they had full 
information of other player’s bidding history. However, in the second price auction 
game, the winning player’s payoff is the difference between the second lowest price 
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and given player’s own cost. Therefore, the frequency of bid price 15 increased 
overall for all games compared to prices 20 and 25, since players can expect more 



































Figure 5.14 Probability of choice over 80 games for epistemic learning game (three-
player experiment) 
 
Figure 5.14 indicates the players’ probability15 of selecting each alternative over 
the 80 games, using the epistemic learning data, as well as each player’s risk 
management preference. From this perspective, all players were risk neutral 
compared to those in the first experiment. Players were more competitive in this 
second experiment. Therefore, because all players had information about competitors’ 























history, they could not afford to take the same risks as those players in the first 
experiment.   
A linear regression model is estimated using the epistemic learning data. The bid 
price is a dependent variable, and the winning payoff is an independent variable. In 
the second auction game, this winning payoff used in a regression model is not an 
exact payoff that players can have after that game if they win that game. However, we 
use this payoff as an independent variable, since players cannot predict the real values 
of their payoffs. They expect that they will have more payoffs than this winning 
payoff, which is the difference between the player’s bid price and given costs, if they 
win that game. This model tests whether a winning payoff variable has a significant 
effect on the choice of bid price. The linear regression formulation (equation (5.3)) 
shows the relationship between the chosen bid price and the payoffs received. Table 
5.7 presents the regression results for the epistemic learning experimental data. 
 
Table 5.7 Regression results for epistemic learning data (three-player experiment)  
 Player1 Player2 Player3 All 
 B t-value B t-value B t-value B t-value 
(Constant) 14.802 43.550 15.414 48.685 15.328 44.212 15.203 80.257 
Payoff 0.924 6.462 0.971 10.721 0.858 4.987 0.943 13.469 
R2 0.346 0.593 0.239 0.429 
SSE 719.623 639.181 701.389 2082.166 
SSR 380.377 929.954 220.833 1567.423 




We found a significant positive correlation between payoffs and bid price based on 
the t-values at a 95 percent confidence level. Players having more winning payoffs 
bid higher prices. The Table 5.7 shows that Player 2 is more concerned about the 
winning payoff than other players in the epistemic learning game, as indicated by the 
R-square value. This R-square value indicates that 59.3 percent of the variance in bid 
price can be predicted from the player’s winning payoffs variable.  Note that this is an 
overall measure of the strength of association; however, the R-square values for 
goodness-of-fit are not high enough to explain either player’s bidding behavior. In the 
multi-player and the second price auction games, players could consider the other 
competitor’s strategies by observing their sequence of choice. Thus, more related 
factors must be included in the model structure. 
Figures 5.15, 5.16, and 5.17 present the actual frequency of bid price choices for 
each player using behavioral reinforcement data. In this experiment, players could 
track their own history of bidding choices over several games. The rank order of 
player’s frequency of bid price choices at the end of sequential games differs from the 
corresponding rank order observed in the three-player epistemic learning experiment. 
Players are more likely to choose bid price 15 (BP=15) than other prices. Accordingly, 
players prefer to choose bid price 20 (BP=20) over bid prices 10 (BP=10) and 25 
(BP=25). Player 3 prefers to choose bid price 20 over bid price 15 until 35 games 
(t=0~35). This example shows that players try to avoid choosing between two 
extreme bid prices (highest and lowest), since players may have low payoffs and a 
low probability to win. In this experiment, the second price auction was applied, 
which can be riskier for players, since players can rely on the auction type and their 
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payoffs in the behavioral reinforcement learning game. In the epistemic learning 
game, players cannot take as many risks as those in the behavioral reinforcement 
game, since players know each other’s choices. Therefore, the probability of choosing 
bid price 10 in the epistemic learning game for the three-player experiment is higher 
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Figure 5.15 Player 1’s actual frequency of bid price choice for behavioral 
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Figure 5.16 Player 2’s actual frequency of bid price choice for behavioral 
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Figure 5.17 Player 3’s actual frequency of bid price choice for behavioral 
reinforcement learning experiment data (three-player experiment) 
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Figure 5.18 shows the probability of each bid price choice across 80 games using 
behavioral reinforcement data. The probability of each bid choice reveals each 
player’s bidding strategy and risk management preference. Player 2 chooses bid price 
10 less often than other players. Player 2 takes greater risks in the behavioral 
reinforcement experiment than other players. By choosing bid prices 10 and 15, 





































Figure 5.18 Probability of choice over 80 times for behavioral reinforcement (two-
player experiment) 
 
Table 5.8 shows the linear regression model estimation results using behavioral 
reinforcement learning data.  We try to determine the relationship between two 
variables: bid price and winning payoffs.  
 
 117 
Table 5.8 Regression results for behavioral reinforcement learning experiment data 
(three-player experiment)  
 Player1 Player2 Player3 All 
 B t-value B t-value B t-value B t-value 
(Constant) 14.886 42.583 15.657 48.691 15.527 49.999 15.384 81.658 
Payoff 0.931 7.407 0.738 6.870 0.654 6.682 0.759 12.033 
R2 0.410 0.374 0.361 0.375 
SSE 719.493 595.107 610.510 1968.314 
SSR 499.643 355.510 345.045 1182.509 
SST 1219.136 950.617 955.556 3150.823 
 
Table 5.8 presents the value of the R-square, which is less than 0.5. This means 
that this model is not a good reflection of the relationship between bid price and 
winning payoffs. The winning payoff variable has a significant t-value at a 95 percent 
confidence level for all cases. This demonstrates that our estimates are still 
statistically unbiased but are infected with more noise. Unlike with the epistemic 
results, Player 1 is more concerned about the winning payoff when choosing a bid 
price than Players 2 and 3, as seen by the R-square value. From the above results, we 
can conclude that the winning payoff cannot explain each player’s bidding behavior; 
such relationships cannot be linearly described. Therefore, we consider different types 
of variables, the average payoff for behavioral reinforcement learning, and possible 
payoffs based on the player’s mixed strategy choice for epistemic learning to describe 
bidding behavior.  
Figures 5.19 and 5.20 show the probability of winning or tying for each 
experiment. In the epistemic learning game, players received information about other 
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players’ choices after each game. Therefore, each player could make a decision after 
considering other players’ actions. Accordingly, the frequency of ties for players in 
the epistemic learning game was less than in the behavioral reinforcement game. The 
epistemic learning game in Figure 5.19 shows that the winning frequency for Player 1 
is higher than for other players in all 80 games; Player 1 is a dominant winner. At the 
end of game, the frequency of winning for all players is very similar. For the two-
player experiment, on the other hand, there was a dominant winner in the epistemic 
learning game (see Figure 5.9). This implies that a player with more winning 
experience can retain winning probability, since that winner has a greater ability to 
predict other player’s bidding behavior using epistemic learning information.  
In the behavioral reinforcement game, however, we could not say which player 
was the dominant winner. The behavioral reinforcement learning process assumes 
that players cannot track competitor’s choices; they can only review their own past 
payoffs before making a decision. Therefore, no player can predict their competitor’s 
next action.  A player whose bid choice resulted in high payoffs in the past will have 




































































Figure 5.20 Players’ winning frequency for behavioral reinforcement learning 
experiment data (three-player experiment) 
                                                 
16 Winning frequency includes the number of tie game 
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Chapter 6. Dynamic Multinomial Probit Estimation 
Results 
6.1. Introduction  
The previous chapter discussed the results of the explanatory analysis on two 
experimental datasets. This chapter focuses on providing empirical results and 
estimates of the two models, using data from the two sequential choice experiments 
described in Chapter 5. Before the estimation, we must classify the two learning 
models corresponding to the two experimental datasets and the two types of mixed 
learning model corresponding to the epistemic experimental datasets. In addition, 
three types of learning model specifications (epistemic, behavioral reinforcement, and 
mixed learning) are investigated for DMNP and DML model frameworks. Three 
different models of learning procedures are estimated to further demonstrate the 
capability of the developed MLE estimation procedure for DMNP models with a 
large number of parameters, alternatives, and error structures. 
We interpret the estimation results for cognitive learning models by evaluating the 
performance of the learning sequences of choices mentioned earlier in the DMNP 
model. In this chapter, we first discuss the epistemic learning estimation results 
generated by the DMNP model (Section 6.2); then, we present the behavioral 
reinforcement learning estimation results (Section 6.3); In Section 6.4, the statistical 
test results are presented to test the mis-specification for both learning models; finally, 
we specify the mixed learning models and provide the estimation results of the mixed 
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learning model (Section 6.5). All numerical experiments in this study were 
implemented using FORTRAN as the programming language. 


















nm γγ =  . The estimation results 
for the behavioral reinforcement, epistemic, and mixed learning models are shown, 
with error structure in the following sections. 
 
6.2. Epistemic Learning Behavioral Interpretation  
The explanatory variables included in the empirical epistemic learning model 
specification (Table 6.1) are the player’s expected payoffs given their beliefs17 
regarding the opponent’s type and habit persistence. Average payoff, cumulative 
choice sequence, and habit persistence variables are used in the behavioral 
reinforcement learning model specification in Tables 6.2 and 6.3.  
Table 6.1 presents the estimation results using the datasets for the epistemic 
learning case. As expected, the coefficients for the player’s expected payoffs, given a 
belief regarding the opponent’s type in the epistemic learning model, is positive and 
strongly significant. The empirical results for the epistemic learning model indicate 
that, given a belief regarding the opponent’s type, players who feel more positively 
about the expected payoff have a greater utility for the alternative bid price than 
                                                 
17 the form of stationarity of opponents’ behavior 
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players who have less expected payoff. These results imply that a player who follows 
the epistemic learning rule is sensitive to other players’ choice decisions, since mixed 
strategies given by players’ choice combinations determine the payoffs. However, the 
results also demonstrate the decreasing utility of bid price with increasing utility of 
previous time periods in habit persistence term. A player adopting the epistemic 
learning rule is more concerned with other players’ current possible choices than with 
his or her own previous utility. Players tend to believe that the previous high utility of 
that bid price choice cannot guarantee the high utility of that bid price in the current 
game. Players prefer to know the opponent’s type before making a decision each 
game.  
In order to test the player’s epistemic learning behavior, epistemic learning 
datasets were applied to the behavioral reinforcement model specification and the 
estimation results are presented in Table 6.2. The hypothesis of this experiment is that 
even though a player has knowledge of an opponent’s type, the player will behave in 
a manner consistent with the behavioral reinforcement learning rule. The results in 
Table 6.2 show that the coefficients for the explanatory variables and error terms are 
significant, but the log likelihood ratio in Table 6.2 is less than that of Table 6.1 (the 
epistemic learning model).  This may imply that players who hold to the epistemic 
learning rule are more likely to use all information about their opponent’s type to 
make a decision.  
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Table 6.1 Estimated parameters of the epistemic learning DMNP model using 
epistemic learning data for the two-player experiment 
 Epistemic Learning Model
18
 
Attributes Estimates T-value 
Initial Value ( Iβ ) -0.842 -5.836 
Constant(alt1, 10β ) -0.087 -8.720 
Constant(alt2, 20β ) -0.712 -3.369 
Constant(alt3, 30β ) -0.507 -4.412 
Payoff based on the belief of opponents 
action ( 1β ) 
1.770 4.505 
Habit persistence 1 ( 2β ) -0.288 -3.296 
1ρ  0.408 4.823 
2ρ  (Habit persistence 2) 0.369 9.950 
12
12γ  0.356 2.634 
13
12γ  0.481 2.006 
14
12γ  -0.005 -3.568 
23
12γ  0.003 7.173 
24
12γ  -0.003 -1.639 
34
12γ  0.029 4.500 
12
21γ  -0.594 -1.989 
13
21γ  -0.008 -7.579 
14
21γ  0.853 1.302 
23
21γ  -1.241 -4.569 
24
21γ  1.162 4.144 
34
21γ  -0.081 -2.810 
Log-likelihood at convergence -0.4175 
 
                                                 






































































Table 6.2 Estimated parameters of the behavioral reinforcement learning DMNP 
model using epistemic learning data for the two-player experiment 
 




Attributes Estimates T-value 
Initial Value ( Iβ ) 0.000 -7.777 
Constant(alt1, 10β ) -0.207 -4.996 
Constant(alt2, 20β ) 0.671 5.842 
Constant(alt3, 30β ) 0.408 3.343 
Avg. payoff ( 1β ) 0.490 3.539 
Sequence of choice ( 2β ) 0.517 3.374 
Habit persistence 1 ( 3β ) -0.140 -2.056 
1ρ  0.469 11.335 
2ρ  (Habit persistence 2) -0.136 -4.258 
12
12γ  0.131 2.693 
13
12γ  0.145 3.147 
14
12γ  0.000 -5.519 
23
12γ  -0.429 -1.958 
24
12γ  -0.076 -3.930 
34
12γ  0.500 8.144 
12
21γ  -0.484 -2.609 
13
21γ  0.207 3.247 
14
21γ  0.065 9.365 
23
21γ  -0.334 -1.844 
24
21γ  0.074 13.652 
34
21γ  0.290 2.791 
Log-likelihood at convergence -0.9039 
 
                                                 



















































































6.3. Behavioral Reinforcement Learning Behavioral Interpretation  
Table 6.3 shows the empirical results for the behavioral reinforcement case. The 
average payoff (normalized by each player’s number of trials) and the cumulative 
sequence of the player’s choice variables in the behavioral reinforcement learning 
model are statistically significant. Two variables capture the effects of a given 
player’s learning, based on their own payoff and the bid price choice. Players with 
high payoffs for a certain alternative bid price throughout the game prefer to choose 
that bid price in order to secure more payoffs. Players who choose high bid prices are 
considered risk takers, since the probability of winning with the high bid is less than 
winning with a low bid. In addition, players having low payoffs cannot take the risk 
of choosing a high bid price choice as often as players with high payoffs. Such 
players prefer to win, even though they receive lower payoffs associated with a low 
bid price.  
Since these players do not know their opponents’ type and future payoffs, their 
decisions are related more to their own past payoffs and choices. Hence, the 
coefficient for the cumulative sequence of choice variable is positive and significant. 
However, the coefficient for the previous deterministic utility (habit persistence I) is 
negative, as in the epistemic learning model (see Table 6.1). Habit persistence 
represents the intensity of habit formation and introduces the concept of non-
separability of preferences over time. Under this condition, an increase in current 
utility lowers the marginal utility in the current period and increases it in the next 
period. Intuitively, more players have a positive preference for that alternative in the 
current game, and players are more likely to choose that alternative in the next game. 
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Table 6.3 Estimated parameters of the behavioral reinforcement learning20 DMNP 
model using behavioral reinforcement data for the two-player experiment 
Attributes Estimates T-value 
Initial Value ( Iβ ) 0.011 11.325 
Constant(alt1, 10β ) -0.014 -6.480 
Constant(alt2, 20β ) -0.013 -1.848 
Constant(alt3, 30β ) 0.018 3.560 
Avg. payoff ( 1β ) 0.008 6.871 
Sequence of choice ( 2β ) 0.009 3.540 
Habit persistence 1 ( 3β ) -0.013 -2.367 
1ρ  -0.001 -1.788 
2ρ  (Habit persistence 2) 0.018 4.264 
12
12γ  0.019 6.877 
13
12γ  0.031 2.643 
14
12γ  0.002 2.690 
23
12γ  0.016 4.639 
24
12γ  0.015 2.418 
34
12γ  0.004 5.217 
12
21γ  0.011 26.486 
13
21γ  0.037 4.780 
14
21γ  0.004 4.489 
23
21γ  -0.011 -3.904 
24
21γ  -0.033 -2.305 
34
21γ  0.015 4.219 
Log-likelihood at convergence -1.4180 
 
                                                 



















































































The estimates for the variance and covariance terms for bid price choice are 
significant at a reasonable confidence level (Tables 6.1– 6.3). This indicates that we 
must specify the error incorporating the impact of a player’s competitive bid price 
choice. In particular, the coefficients for the error term for competition that impact the 
bid price choice for each player ( ijnmγ  and 
ij
mnγ ) differ, which implies that each player 
responds differently to other player’s choice decisions, relative to the competitive 
impact of his or her own decisions.  
 
6.4. Statistical Test for Epistemic vs. Behavioral Reinforcement Learning Model 
We observe that some players do not follow the epistemic learning rule over all 
games, even though they have full information about competitors’ actions. As 
previously mentioned, the behavioral reinforcement model estimation results were 
provided using the epistemic learning datasets to verify whether the player behaved in 
a manner consistent with the behavioral reinforcement learning process in the 
epistemic learning game. Thus, we applied the observed datasets from epistemic 
learning game to the epistemic and behavioral reinforcement model structures (see 
Table 6.4 for the estimation results).  
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Table 6.4 Estimated parameters of the epistemic (restricted) learning and behavioral 
reinforcement (unrestricted) learning DMNP models using the epistemic learning 
datasets (two-player experiment) 
 Epistemic  
Behavioral 
Reinforcement 
Attributes Estimates T-value Estimates T-value 
Initial Value ( Iβ ) -0.842 -5.836 0.011 11.325 
Constant(alt1, 10β ) -0.087 -8.720 -0.014 -6.480 
Constant(alt2, 20β ) -0.712 -3.369 -0.013 -1.848 
Constant(alt3, 30β ) -0.507 -4.412 0.018 3.560 
Possible Payoff ( 1β ) 1.770 4.505 - - 
Avg. payoff ( 2β ) - - 0.008 6.871 
Sequence of choice ( 3β ) - - 0.009 3.540 
Habit persistence 1  
( 4β ) 
-0.288 -3.296 -0.013 -2.367 
1ρ  0.408 4.823 -0.001 -1.788 
2ρ  (Habit persistence 2) 0.369 9.950 0.018 4.264 
12
12γ  0.356 2.634 0.019 6.877 
13
12γ  0.481 2.006 0.031 2.643 
14
12γ  -0.005 -3.568 0.002 2.690 
23
12γ  0.003 7.173 0.016 4.639 
24
12γ  -0.003 -1.639 0.015 2.418 
34
12γ  0.029 4.500 0.004 5.217 
12
21γ  -0.594 -1.989 0.011 26.486 
13
21γ  -0.008 -7.579 0.037 4.780 
14
21γ  0.853 1.302 0.004 4.489 
23
21γ  -1.241 -4.569 -0.011 -3.904 
24
21γ  1.162 4.144 -0.033 -2.305 
34
21γ  -0.081 -2.810 0.015 4.219 
Log-likelihood at convergence -0.4175 -0.9039 
 
The following procedure shows the difference between both cognitive learning 
models and verifies the effects of the related payoffs and sequential choice variables 
on bidding behavior.  
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In Table 6.4, both learning models show the statistical significance of the player’s 
bidding behavior. To explain this behavior, we must determine whether the epistemic 
and behavioral reinforcement models differ. On one hand, only one learning model 
can be used to describe the player’s choice behavior; on the other hand, we can 
conclude that both models are useful for explaining the bid price choice behavior in 
the epistemic learning game. The Hausman specification test is performed to 
determine this.  
First proposed by Hausman (1978), this test evaluates model mis-specification. We 
first test the following null hypothesis: 
 :0H  Our model is mis-specified against the alternative model 
The Hausman test statistic is 
[ ] [ ] [ ]rururu VVH ββββ −−−= −1'  
where 
uβ : the coefficients of variables in behavioral reinforcement learning (unrestricted) 
model 
rβ : the coefficient of variables in the epistemic learning (restricted) model 
uV : the variance of variables in behavioral reinforcement learning (unrestricted) 
model 
rV : the variance of variables in epistemic learning (restricted) model 
This incorporates the test conducted between the restricted model r, estimated for 
the epistemic learning models in Table 6.4, and the full model u, estimated for the 
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behavioral reinforcement learning model in Table 6.4.  If the model is correctly 
specified, then the null hypothesis will be rejected, and we can conclude that two 
models are different and the epistemic learning model structure is well-specified. The 
test statistic [ ] [ ] [ ]rururu VVH ββββ −−−= −1'  is asymptotically chi-square distributed 
with 
rK  degrees of freedom, where rK  is the number of coefficients in the restricted 
choice set model; uβ  and rβ  are the coefficient vectors estimated for the unrestricted 
and restricted choice sets, respectively; and uV  and rV  are the variance-covariance 
matrices for the unrestricted and restricted choice sets, respectively. The Hausman 
statistics value for the two-player experiment is: 
[ ] [ ] [ ] 05.2651' =−−−= − rururu VVH ββββ  
The chi-square value for 20 degrees of freedom and 95% confidence level is 31.41 
( 41.312 05.0,20 =χ ). Because the chi-square value is less than 265.05, we can reject this 
null hypothesis.  We can also conclude that both models are well-specified and that 
there is difference between two learning models to describe player’s bidding behavior.  
This result demonstrates that both the epistemic and behavioral reinforcement 
model specifications are different but useful to describe the player’s bid choice 
behavior in the epistemic learning game. It also implies that players behave in a 
manner consistent with both cognitive learning processes. This means that the mixed 
type of learning rule can be applied, since the player’s bidding dynamics cannot be 
fully explained by either cognitive learning model for the two-player experiment.  
From this, we can suggest the general type of learning model specification to explain 
 131 
player’s behaving in both cognitive learning rules. Thus, the mixed learning model is 
investigated for this general learning model to include two learning models as a 
special case. This mixed learning model can be better than the epistemic and 
behavioral reinforcement learning model to describe the player’s bidding behavior by 
incorporating both elements from the epistemic and behavioral reinforcement 
learning processes.  
We must specify the different model specifications and structures for the mixed 
learning process. The estimation procedure and model structures for mixed learning 
process were presented in the Chapter 4. The mixed learning model estimation results 
for the two-player experiment using the DMNP model are shown in the following 
section. 
 
6.5. DMNP Mixed Learning Models 
Mixed learning models integrate appropriate elements of behavioral reinforcement 
and epistemic learning approaches. We have already shown that both learning models 
can describe the player’s bidding behavior for the epistemic learning game. 
Accordingly, the mixed learning model can be useful to improve their predictive 
accuracy, since it includes two learning models as special cases. This section 
demonstrates the important features of the mixed learning model. The maximum-
likelihood parameter estimates are derived to test the empirical usefulness of mixed 
learning models using the two-player epistemic learning experiment datasets.  The 
estimation process and the definition of parameters are described in Section 4.8. The 
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following Table 6.5 illustrates the estimation results of the mixed learning DMNP 
model I using the epistemic learning data. 
 
Table 6.5 Estimated parameters of the mixed learning DMNP model I using the 
epistemic learning datasets (two-player experiment) 
Attributes Estimates T-value 
Initial Value (
Iβ ) 0.184 5.341 
Constant(alt1, 10β ) 0.086 3.643 
Constant(alt2, 20β ) 0.471 3.216 
Constant(alt3, 30β ) -0.247 -2.534 
Possible Payoff ( 1β ) 0.838 2.504 
Avg. payoff ( 2β ) 0.467 4.591 
Sequence of choice ( 3β ) 0.132 3.344 
Habit persistence 1 ( 4β ) -0.092 -6.242 
E
1α  0.344 3.846 
E
2α  0.072 4.506 
1ρ  -0.168 -3.208 
2ρ  (Habit persistence 2) -0.577 -4.458 
12
12γ  -0.433 -1.995 
13
12γ  -0.060 -3.485 
14
12γ  -0.575 -4.670 
23
12γ  -0.062 -5.683 
24
12γ  0.078 3.641 
34
12γ  -0.602 -2.760 
12
21γ  -0.207 -4.471 
13
21γ  0.627 5.200 
14
21γ  0.001 4.804 
23
21γ  0.294 7.204 
24
21γ  0.490 3.041 
34
21γ  0.432 1.902 
Log-likelihood at convergence -0.994 
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The mixed learning model I includes all explanatory variables in the epistemic and 
behavioral reinforcement models: initial attraction, possible payoff, average payoff, 
sequence of choice, and habit persistence. In this model, the players’ utilities of 
strategies are affected by the number of choices for that strategy, the average payoffs 
for the strategies provided, and the expected payoffs associated with the combination 
of strategies among players, which are updated after each game. In addition, the 
mixed learning models require the specification of the player’s degree of propensity 
for each epistemic and behavioral reinforcement learning rule ( Enα  and 
R
nα ).  
According to Table 6.5, the coefficients of explanatory variables in mixed learning 
model I are statistically significant. Players who feel positive about their strategies 
and payoffs have a greater utility for the bid price that provided more payoffs and 
wins. Habit persistence has a negative coefficient; these estimation results are 
consistent with the results in Section 6.2 for the epistemic and behavioral 
reinforcement models using the epistemic learning datasets. The degree of propensity 
for the epistemic learning rule is 0.344 for Player 1 and 0.072 for Player 2; the degree 
of propensity for the behavioral reinforcement learning rule is 0.656 for Player 1 and 
0.928 for Player 2. The probability of both players behaving in a manner consistent 
with the epistemic learning is less than the probability for the behavioral 
reinforcement learning players. However, Player 2 has a greater probability to be a 
behavioral reinforcement player over all games than Player 1.  
The mixed learning model I assumes that players’ choice decisions corresponding 
to his/her cognitive learning type are independent from other players’ cognitive 
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learning rules. This means that the competitor’s cognitive learning belief on the bid 
price choice does not affect the player’s choice of cognitive learning rules and related 
decisions. However, we expect that the players will dynamically adjust to the 
competitive environment and make the best response by observing competitors’ 
choice decisions and their cognitive learning rules and beliefs. To evaluate the 
interaction among players, the estimation results for the mixed learning model II are 
presented in Table 6.6.  
The coefficient for the explanatory variables in mixed learning model II (Table 
6.6) is statistically significant, and the behavioral interpretations for the effect of 
those explanatory variables on players’ bidding behavior are same as the mixed 
learning model I estimation results. As explained in Section 4.8, mixed learning 
model II includes parameters for the degree of propensity for mixed cognitive 
learning processes among players. It shows both players’ preferences for each type of 
mixed cognitive learning. For two players, there are four types of mixed learning 
processes, described in Table 6.7.  
In Table 6.6, the parameter values for the degree of propensity for each mixed type 
of learning process demonstrate that both players are more likely to behave according 
to the behavioral reinforcement learning process in 58% of games. This implies that 
players have strong interaction when both players behave in a manner consistent with 
the behavioral reinforcement learning process. Both players exhibit epistemic 
learning behavior for 25% of games; this behavior is consistent with the behavioral 
interpretation shown in mixed learning model I, which implies that both players’ 
decisions are strongly involved with the behavioral reinforcement learning process. 
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To test the independence of players’ cognitive learning processes, estimation results 
from both mixed learning models are provided in Tables 6.7 and 6.8. 
 
Table 6.6 Estimated parameters of the mixed learning DMNP model II using the 
epistemic learning datasets (two-player experiment) 
Attributes Estimates T-value 
Initial Value (
Iβ ) 0.849 2.377 
Constant(alt1, 10β ) 0.204 6.339 
Constant(alt2, 20β ) 0.747 7.551 
Constant(alt3, 30β ) -0.198 -5.195 
Possible Payoff ( 1β ) 0.301 5.063 
Avg. payoff ( 2β ) 0.460 5.573 
Sequence of choice ( 3β ) 0.044 1.920 
Habit persistence 1 ( 4β ) -0.546 -11.412 
EE
12α  0.251 7.115 
ER
12α  0.000 2.021 
RR
12α  0.581 2.861 
1ρ  0.369 21.606 
2ρ  (Habit persistence 2) 0.127 2.951 
12
12γ  -0.374 -2.200 
13
12γ  -0.106 -3.337 
14
12γ  0.313 1.821 
23
12γ  0.266 5.552 
24
12γ  0.035 2.005 
34
12γ  -0.455 -2.117 
12
21γ  -0.223 -2.516 
13
21γ  0.028 2.310 
14
21γ  -0.291 -5.783 
23
21γ  -0.667 -3.142 
24
21γ  0.783 2.506 
34
21γ  -0.050 -5.416 
Log-likelihood at convergence -1.240 
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Table 6.7 The mixed cognitive learning (MCL) index and estimation results from the 
mixed learning DMNP model II for the two-player experiment 
Player 1 Player 2  
m
nα  # of 80 games21 





12α  0.000 0 
Behavioral  
Reinforcement 






12α  0.581 46 
 
 
Table 6.8 The mixed cognitive learning (MCL) index and estimation results from the 
mixed learning DMNP model I for the two-player experiment 
Player 1 Player 2  
m
nα 22 # of 80 games 





12α  0.319 26 
Behavioral  
Reinforcement 






12α  0.609 48 
 
                                                 
















































Figure 6.1 Comparison of the propensity for the mixed cognitive learning process 
between mixed learning DMNP models I and II 
 
If there is no interaction among players in terms of making decisions according to 
their cognitive learning rules, then the degree of propensity for mixed cognitive 
learning processes in Table 6.7 must equal that of Table 6.8. Based on the assumption 
that players’ cognitive learning processes are independent, the joint probability for the 
degree of propensity for mixed cognitive learning processes among all players ( mnα ) 
is calculated using the degree of propensity for each player’s cognitive learning 




2112 ααα ×=  
REER
2112 ααα ×=  
ERRE
2112 ααα ×=  
RRRR
2112 ααα ×=                                                                                                           (6.1)
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Figure 6.1 compares the propensity values for the mixed cognitive learning 
processes among all players in mixed learning models I and II.  The degree of 
propensity for the behavioral reinforcement learning process (RR) in both learning 
models is higher than any other mixed learning process. The propensity of the 
epistemic learning process for both players (EE) is higher than the propensity for the 
Player 1’s epistemic and Player 2’s behavioral reinforcement learning (ER) or Player 
1’s behavioral reinforcement and Player 2’s epistemic learning (RE) in mixed 
learning model II. However, the propensity for the Player 1’s epistemic learning and 
Player 2’s behavioral reinforcement learning process (ER) is higher than the 
propensity for the epistemic learning for both players (EE) and the behavioral 
reinforcement learning for Player 1 and the epistemic learning for Player 2 (RE) in 
mixed learning model I. As shown in Figure 6.1, the propensity value for each mixed 
learning process differs between mixed learning model I and II, especially for the EE, 
ER, and RE cases. Therefore, the following statistical test is required to evaluate the 
difference between two mixed learning models. 
Both results in Tables 6.7 and 6.8 provide the input values for the cross-tabulation 
and chi-square test to assess the independence of players’ cognitive learning 
processes, which are presented in Tables 6.9 and 6.10.   
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Table 6.9 Model *MCL cross-tabulation for the two-player DMNP model 
  Player’s Mixed Cognitive Learning (MCL) Total 
  EE ER RE RR  








9.1% 100.0% 22.2% 51.1% 50.0% 
 % of Total 1.3% 16.3% 2.5% 30.0% 50.0% 








90.9% 0.0% 77.8% 48.9% 50.0% 
 % of Total 12.5% 0.0% 8.8% 28.8% 50.0% 








100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 % of Total 13.8% 16.3% 11.3% 58.8% 100.0% 
 
Table 6.10 Chi-Square Tests for the two-player DMNP model 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 46.325 3 0.000 
Likelihood Ratio 59.065 3 0.000 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
0.700 1 0.403 
N of Valid Cases 160   
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The chi-square test is used to find the difference between frequencies for the 
propensity for each mixed cognitive learning process in models I and II. The null 
hypothesis for the chi-square test follows: 
0H : There is no difference between mixed learning models I and II. 
In Table 6.9, the cross-tabulation result illustrates that the degree of propensity for 
each mixed cognitive learning process differs between the mixed learning models. In 
addition, the chi-square test result in Table 6.10 indicates that there is strong 
interaction among players’ cognitive learning processes related to the choice decision. 
From this, we can conclude that a player considers competitors’ cognitive learning 
type and their beliefs; hence a player switch his/her cognitive learning type according 
to his/her belief about compeitotor’s cognitive learning type. Therefore, mixed 
learning model II is preferred to explain players’ mixed cognitive learning behavior in 
sequential games. 
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Chapter 7. Dynamic Mixed Logit Estimation Results 
7.1. Introduction  
This chapter presents the empirical results and estimates of the learning models, 
using learning game datasets for the two and three-player sequential choice 
experiments. Before the estimation, we classify and specify two learning models 
corresponding to the two types of experimental game datasets described in Section 
4.3. In addition, the mixed learning models are investigated to describe players’ 
mixed learning behavior on bid price choice, as described in Section 4.8.  
We apply the dynamic mixed logit (DML) model to existing bidding data from the 
two types of learning games for each experiment. Two different model structures for 
each cognitive learning procedure and mixed learning process are estimated to further 
demonstrate the capability of the developed MLE estimation procedure for DML 
models with a large number of parameters, alternatives, and error structures. We 
interpret the estimation results for learning models by evaluating the performance of 
the learning choice sequence. All numerical experiments in this study were 
implemented using FORTRAN as the programming language. 
The same variance and covariance terms were assumed in it
nv  and 
it
nΩ  in order to 
simplify the estimate as follows: 
22












nm γγ =   
where 
 142 
i  and j : alternative bid prices 
n , m , and l : a players 
2
iσ  and 
2
jσ : the variance of error term 
ii
nmγ : the covariance across players for the same alternative 
ij
nmγ : the covariance across players when each player choose different choice 
In our analysis, we consider several error component specifications in the DML 
model to introduce correlation in the utilities.  The best statistical result included error 
components to accommodate correlation across alternatives ( 1ρ ), serial correlation 
( 2ρ ), and correlation among competitors (
ij
nmγ ).  
As presented in Chapter 6, the DMNP estimation results using the same two-player 
experiment dataset were provided for the epistemic, behavioral reinforcement, and 
mixed learning processes. We expect that DML model will easily allow for the 
estimation of learning models for multiple players. Our analysis indicates that the 
DML structure is as statistically good as the DMNP structure. 
 
7.2. Epistemic Learning Behavioral Interpretation  
The fundamental hypothesis underlying our empirical analysis is that players’ 
bidding decisions are largely due to sequential history of choice, payoff, and habit 
persistence, which are related to players’ cognitive learning processes. The final 
variable specifications for the epistemic learning model (see Tables 7.1 and 7.2) are 
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initial attraction, player’s expected payoffs given opponents’ beliefs, habit persistence, 
and variance-covariance terms.  
 
Table 7.1 Estimated parameters of the epistemic learning DML model using 
epistemic learning data for the two-player experiment 
Attributes Estimates T-value 
Initial Value (
Iβ ) 0.475 50.480 
Constant(alt1, 10β ) 0.118 30.481 
Constant(alt2, 20β ) 0.201 32.683 
Constant(alt3, 30β ) -0.393 -48.633 
Possible payoff ( 1β ) 0.707 18.520 
Habit persistence 1 ( 4β ) -0.188 -38.435 
1ρ  0.480 22.190 
Habit persistence 2 ( 2ρ ) 0.130 25.713 
12
12γ  -0.060 -32.171 
13
12γ  -0.158 -190.645 
14
12γ  0.500 55.697 
23
12γ  0.098 18.685 
24
12γ  -0.033 -19.447 
34
12γ  0.241 29.687 
12
21γ  0.346 46.208 
13
21γ  -0.005 -44.532 
14
21γ  -0.026 -38.424 
23
21γ  -0.271 -29.182 
24
21γ  0.170 24.468 
34
21γ  -0.005 -110.547 




Table 7.2 Estimated parameters of the epistemic learning DML model using 
epistemic learning data for the three-player experiment 
Attributes Estimates T-value 
Initial Value ( Iβ ) 0.124 48.788 
Constant(alt1, 10β ) 0.011 18.692 
Constant(alt2, 20β ) -0.140 -17.251 
Constant(alt3, 30β ) -0.105 -15.528 
Possible payoff ( 1β ) 0.392 26.599 
Habit persistence 1 ( 4β ) 0.157 65.856 
1ρ  0.358 26.239 
Habit persistence 2 ( 2ρ ) 0.486 27.102 
12
1mγ  -0.031 -21.051 
13
1mγ  0.035 17.095 
14
1mγ  0.280 108.171 
23
1mγ  0.139 22.320 
24
1mγ  0.070 49.181 
34
1mγ  0.006 15.357 
12
2mγ  0.088 8.172 
13
2mγ  -0.001 -9.147 
14
2mγ  -0.313 -76.756 
23
2mγ  -0.086 -26.998 
24
2mγ  0.474 79.457 
34
2mγ  -0.598 -34.679 
12
3mγ  0.003 14.364 
13
3mγ  -0.044 -65.633 
14
3mγ  0.195 20.742 
23
3mγ  -0.004 -15.754 
24
3mγ  0.107 22.955 
34
3mγ  0.063 51.468 
Log-likelihood at convergence -279.805 
 
The coefficients indicate the effects of these variables on players’ propensity for 
certain bid prices. As expected, the coefficients for the expected payoffs ( 1β ), given a 
player’s belief regarding their opponents’ type in the epistemic learning model, are 
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positive and strongly significant. The impact of the possible payoff23 in Tables 7.1 
and 7.2 indicates that the propensity associated with the level of bid prices increases 
with the possible expected payoffs, which are calculated by multiplying the 
probability of other players’ past bid choices by the corresponding player’s payoff 
from the mixed strategy; this is consistent with the findings presented in the previous 
chapter. Furthermore, players who feel more positively about the expected payoff, 
given a belief regarding the opponent’s type, choose that bid price more often to 
achieve greater payoffs. Through this process, players can build beliefs about 
competitors’ choices in the current game by observing their past choices. Given that 
updated belief about competitor’s type, players can calculate their expected payoffs 
for each bid price alternative. Therefore, epistemic learning players have a greater 
capability for concern about their beliefs of competitors’ choices than behavioral 
reinforcement learning players.  
The results for the two-player experiment in Table 7.1 demonstrate that the utility 
of bid price decreases as the utility of the previous game increases, which is observed 
in habit persistence ( 4β ) term. The player behaving in a manner consistent with the 
epistemic learning rule is more concerned about the other player’s choices and the 
corresponding expected payoffs than his or her own previous utility.  However, in 
Table 7.2, the coefficient for the habit persistence for the three-player experiment is 
positive and significant. For the three-player experiment, since there are more 
possible combinations of mixed strategies among competitors, it is more difficult for 


















players to predict expected payoffs.  Players are required to calculate the 
corresponding payoffs of mixed strategies and to build their beliefs about competitors, 
since players have more competition. This implies that a more competitive game 
environment causes players to depend on their own past utility related to that bid 
price. Tables 7.3 and 7.4 present the DML estimation results for behavioral learning 
model specification using epistemic learning data. 
 
Table 7.3 Estimated parameters of the behavioral reinforcement learning DML model 
using epistemic learning data for the two-player experiment 
Attributes Estimates T-value 
Initial Value ( Iβ ) -0.279 -29.109 
Constant(alt1, 10β ) 0.390 54.961 
Constant(alt2, 20β ) -0.036 -79.996 
Constant(alt3, 30β ) 0.021 161.573 
Avg. payoff  ( 2β ) 0.226 92.516 
Sequence of choice ( 3β ) 0.160 29.666 
Habit persistence 1 ( 4β ) -0.067 -110.777 
1ρ  0.305 33.806 
Habit persistence 2 ( 2ρ ) 0.134 37.225 
12
12γ  0.258 47.219 
13
12γ  0.272 69.052 
14
12γ  -0.105 -89.946 
23
12γ  -0.404 -35.735 
24
12γ  0.500 215.525 
34
12γ  0.174 18.697 
12
21γ  0.334 54.440 
13
21γ  -0.056 -61.795 
14
21γ  0.005 96.417 
23
21γ  -0.161 -29.803 
24
21γ  0.037 85.682 
34
21γ  0.019 234.150 
Log-likelihood at convergence -242.526 
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Table 7.4 Estimated parameters of the behavioral reinforcement learning DML model 
using epistemic learning data for the three-player experiment 
Attributes Estimates T-value 
Initial Value ( Iβ ) 0.017 49.478 
Constant(alt1, 10β ) 0.157 39.994 
Constant(alt2, 20β ) -0.647 -15.679 
Constant(alt3, 30β ) 0.223 36.748 
Avg. payoff  ( 2β ) -0.162 -58.909 
Sequence of choice ( 3β ) 0.125 40.044 
Habit persistence 1 ( 4β ) -0.100 -17.005 
1ρ  0.227 31.171 
Habit persistence 2 ( 2ρ ) 0.711 16.612 
12
1mγ  0.057 19.962 
13
1mγ  -0.125 -13.329 
14
1mγ  -0.332 -34.825 
23
1mγ  0.178 49.494 
24
1mγ  0.283 37.323 
34
1mγ  -0.297 -35.248 
12
2mγ  -0.184 -230.516 
13
2mγ  -0.113 -42.051 
14
2mγ  -0.019 -27.437 
23
2mγ  0.329 8.154 
24
2mγ  0.094 18.358 
34
2mγ  -0.479 -23.029 
12
3mγ  -0.082 -13.943 
13
3mγ  0.375 72.809 
14
3mγ  0.500 37.009 
23
3mγ  0.351 35.394 
24
3mγ  0.181 54.912 
34
3mγ  -0.122 -89.938 
Log-likelihood at convergence -309.497 
 
The coefficients of explanatory variables and variance-covariance terms are 
statistically significant for both experiments. The signs of the coefficients of 
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explanatory variables in the DML estimated results for the two-player experiment are 
same as those results in DMNP results for the two-player experiment (see Table 6.1). 
Therefore, the behavioral interpretation is as same as in Section 6.2. The goodness-of-
fit is measured by the likelihood ratio. The log likelihood ratio value in Table 7.3 (-
242.526) is less than the log likelihood ratio value in Table 7.1 (-178.809). This 
means that the epistemic learning model can describe players’ bidding behavior better 
than the behavioral learning model using epistemic learning game data.  
Table 7.4 presents the estimation results of the behavioral reinforcement learning 
model for the three-player experiment using epistemic learning data. The coefficient 
of explanatory variables and variance-covariance terms are statistically significant in 
Table 7.4 (three-player experiment). However, the coefficients for the average payoff 
and habit persistence I variables are negative; this differs from the estimation results 
for the two-player experiment in Table 7.3, implying that players consider their 
possible payoffs given beliefs about opponents’ type rather than their own past 
payoffs. In other words, players are more likely to use information about opponents’ 
past choices to predict their next action. In addition, the log likelihood ratio in Table 
7.4 (-309.497) is less than the log likelihood ration in Table 7.2 (-279.805). From 
these results, players’ bidding behavior for the three-player experiment is well 
explained by the epistemic learning model specification compared to the behavioral 
reinforcement leaning model specification for the epistemic learning game.  
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7.3. Behavioral Reinforcement Learning Behavioral Interpretation 
In this section, we apply the behavioral reinforcement learning model to the 
existing behavioral reinforcement learning datasets. Average payoff, cumulative 
sequence of choice, and habit persistence are used as the explanatory variables in the 
behavioral reinforcement learning model specifications in Tables 7.5 and 7.6 to 
illustrate the impact of these variables on players’ bidding behavior in the behavioral 
reinforcement learning game.  
Tables 7.5 and 7.6 present the estimated parameters of the explanatory variables 
for the behavioral reinforcement model and the error components. The average 
payoff24 (normalized by each player’s number of trials) and the cumulative sequence 
of the players’ choice25 variables in the behavioral reinforcement learning model for 
both experiments are positive and statistically significant. These results are consistent 
with the DMNP estimation results from the behavioral reinforcement learning model 
for the two-player experiment. The estimation results from the average payoff and 
sequence of choice variables show the player’s behavioral learning belief about their 
own payoff for that bid price choice. Players believe that the bid price providing high 
past payoffs can continuously produce high payoffs in future games. They also 
believe that competitors have the same belief about their decisions, which is 
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reinforced by the previous preference for that bid price. Accordingly, the coefficient 
for the cumulative sequence of choice variable is positive and significant.  
The coefficient of habit persistence in deterministic utility is negative and 
statistically significant (Table 7.5). As previously mentioned habit persistence 
represents the intensity of habit formation and introduces non-separability of 
preferences over time. If players do not have the opportunity to choose a certain bid 
price in the past or have less expected payoff for that bid price, even though they 
believe that it is possible to have more payoffs by choosing that bid price, they eager 
to choose that bid price in the future games.  
In Table 7.6, the coefficient of habit persistence for the three-player experiment is 
positive and statistically significant. This indicates that the past choice experience for 
that bid price continues to provide high utility in the current period, but it makes the 
current choice less desirable. In the three-player experiment, players must predict 
more combinations of mixed strategies, because they are competing against more 
players. Therefore, players are not confident that they will win the next game, 
because there is more pressure as a result of observing competitors’ reactions over 
games. 
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Table 7.5 Estimated parameters of the behavioral reinforcement learning DML model 
using behavioral reinforcement data for the two-player experiment 
Attributes Estimates T-value 
Initial Value ( Iβ ) 0.313 47.337 
Constant(alt1, 10β ) -0.003 -95.871 
Constant(alt2, 20β ) -0.088 -17.764 
Constant(alt3, 30β ) 0.299 5.859 
Avg. payoff  ( 2β ) 0.437 31.916 
Sequence of choice ( 3β ) 0.043 5.792 
Habit persistence 1 ( 4β ) -0.345 -11.629 
1ρ  0.473 34.536 
Habit persistence 2 ( 2ρ ) 0.526 62.494 
12
12γ  -0.422 -47.573 
13
12γ  -0.140 -21.602 
14
12γ  -0.197 -25.089 
23
12γ  -0.365 -53.131 
24
12γ  -0.061 -18.170 
34
12γ  0.150 29.485 
12
21γ  0.278 6.044 
13
21γ  0.455 14.268 
14
21γ  -0.115 -37.822 
23
21γ  -0.162 -11.798 
24
21γ  0.262 17.913 
34
21γ  0.200 12.732 




Table 7.6 Estimated parameters of the behavioral reinforcement learning DML model 
using behavioral reinforcement data for the three-player experiment 
Attributes Estimates T-value 
Initial Value ( Iβ ) -0.426 -32.416 
Constant(alt1, 10β ) 0.923 61.830 
Constant(alt2, 20β ) 0.287 38.732 
Constant(alt3, 30β ) -0.078 -31.497 
Avg. payoff  ( 2β ) 0.189 41.618 
Sequence of choice ( 3β ) 0.363 20.317 
Habit persistence 1 ( 4β ) 0.526 31.579 
1ρ  0.684 67.794 
Habit persistence 2 ( 2ρ ) 0.290 26.628 
12
1mγ  -0.221 -30.369 
13
1mγ  -0.095 -92.164 
14
1mγ  -0.281 -41.969 
23
1mγ  1.012 53.951 
24
1mγ  0.253 27.814 
34
1mγ  0.092 66.266 
12
2mγ  -0.507 -37.935 
13
2mγ  0.187 15.031 
14
2mγ  0.132 50.752 
23
2mγ  -0.271 -34.383 
24
2mγ  -0.059 -83.839 
34
2mγ  -0.280 -45.416 
12
3mγ  0.454 17.938 
13
3mγ  0.384 32.052 
14
3mγ  -0.092 -61.246 
23
3mγ  0.247 39.482 
24
3mγ  -0.207 -25.815 
34
3mγ  -0.023 -47.433 
Log-likelihood at convergence -313.129 
 
 The error components introduced in the utility function generate covariance in 
unobserved factors across alternatives, time, and players. The estimates for the 
variance and covariance terms for bid price choice are significant at a reasonable 
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confidence level (Tables 7.1–7.6). We expect that these error terms can capture the 
unobserved competition effect on bidding behavior in learning games; the estimation 
results demonstrate that the error term incorporating the impact of a player’s 
competition must be specified. This implies that player’s decision is affected by other 
players’ choices and corresponding expected payoffs or their own average payoffs. 
This is also observed in the error terms, which indicates the player’s unobserved 
impact of competition among players on the strategy choice decision.   
 
7.4. Statistical Test for Epistemic vs. Behavioral Reinforcement Learning Model 
In Section 7.2, the estimation results show that both the epistemic and behavioral 
reinforcement models are well-fitted to describe the player’s bidding behavior for the 
epistemic game. Here, we evaluate whether those learning models are well-specified. 
Table 7.7 shows the estimation results of both learning models for the two-player 
experiment using the same epistemic learning data.  
 
 154 
Table 7.7 Estimated parameters of the epistemic (restricted) learning and behavioral 





Attributes Estimates T-value Estimates T-value 
Initial Value ( Iβ ) 0.475 50.480 -0.279 -29.109 
Constant(alt1, 10β ) 0.118 30.481 0.390 54.961 
Constant(alt2, 20β ) 0.201 32.683 -0.036 -79.996 
Constant(alt3, 30β ) -0.393 -48.633 0.021 161.573 
Possible Payoff ( 1β ) 0.707 18.520 - - 
Avg. payoff ( 2β ) - - 0.226 92.516 
Sequence of choice ( 3β ) - - 0.160 29.666 
Habit persistence 1 ( 4β ) -0.188 -38.435 -0.067 -110.777 
1ρ  0.480 22.190 0.305 33.806 
2ρ   




12γ  -0.060 -32.171 0.258 47.219 
13
12γ  -0.158 -190.645 0.272 69.052 
14
12γ  0.500 55.697 -0.105 -89.946 
23
12γ  0.098 18.685 -0.404 -35.735 
24
12γ  -0.033 -19.447 0.500 215.525 
34
12γ  0.241 29.687 0.174 18.697 
12
21γ  0.346 46.208 0.334 54.440 
13
21γ  -0.005 -44.532 -0.056 -61.795 
14
21γ  -0.026 -38.424 0.005 96.417 
23
21γ  -0.271 -29.182 -0.161 -29.803 
24
21γ  0.170 24.468 0.037 85.682 
34
21γ  -0.005 -110.547 0.019 234.150 
Log-likelihood at Convergence -178.809 -242.526 
 
To verify that the epistemic learning model is correctly specified, the Hausman 
specification test is applied. This test can be used to obtain an estimator that is 
efficient and consistent under the following hypothesis. 
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0H : Our model is mis-specified against the alternative model 
The Hausman test statistic is 
[ ] [ ] [ ]rururu VVH ββββ −−−= −1'  
where 
uβ : the coefficients of variables in behavioral reinforcement learning (unrestricted) 
model 
rβ : the coefficients of variables in epistemic learning (restricted) model 
uV : the variances of variables in behavioral reinforcement learning (unrestricted) 
model 
rV : the variances of variables in epistemic learning (restricted) model 
The Hausman statistics value is: 
[ ] [ ] [ ] 2.4327641' =−−−= − rururu VVH ββββ  
The Hausman statistical value for the two learning models is 432764.2. The chi-
square value for 20 degrees of freedom and 95% confidence level is 31.41 
( 41.312 05.0,20 =χ ). This Hausman statistical value (432764.2) is higher than the chi-
square value (31.41); therefore, the null hypothesis is rejected. This result is 
consistent with the findings in Section 6.4. The Hausman test evaluates the 
significance of estimators compared to an alternative estimator. Therefore, this result 
demonstrates that the epistemic learning model is well-specified and that there is a 
difference between the learning models in describing bidding behavior. 
Table 7.8 provides the estimation results of the epistemic and behavioral 
reinforcement learning models for the three-player experiment. 
 156 
Table 7.8 Estimated parameters of the epistemic (restricted) learning and behavioral 





Attributes Estimates T-value Estimates T-value 
Initial Value ( Iβ ) 0.124 48.788 0.017 49.478 
Constant(alt1, 10β ) 0.011 18.692 0.157 39.994 
Constant(alt2, 20β ) -0.140 -17.251 -0.647 -15.679 
Constant(alt3, 30β ) -0.105 -15.528 0.223 36.748 
Possible Payoff ( 1β ) 0.392 26.599 - - 
Avg. payoff ( 2β ) - - -0.162 -58.909 
Sequence of choice ( 3β ) - - 0.125 40.044 
Habit persistence 1 ( 4β ) 0.157 65.856 -0.100 -17.005 
1ρ  0.358 26.239 0.227 31.171 
2ρ  (Habit persistence 2) 0.486 27.102 0.711 16.612 
12
1mγ  -0.031 -21.051 0.057 19.962 
13
1mγ  0.035 17.095 -0.125 -13.329 
14
1mγ  0.280 108.171 -0.332 -34.825 
23
1mγ  0.139 22.320 0.178 49.494 
24
1mγ  0.070 49.181 0.283 37.323 
34
1mγ  0.006 15.357 -0.297 -35.248 
12
2mγ  0.088 8.172 -0.184 -230.516 
13
2mγ  -0.001 -9.147 -0.113 -42.051 
14
2mγ  -0.313 -76.756 -0.019 -27.437 
23
2mγ  -0.086 -26.998 0.329 8.154 
24
2mγ  0.474 79.457 0.094 18.358 
34
2mγ  -0.598 -34.679 -0.479 -23.029 
12
3mγ  0.003 14.364 -0.082 -13.943 
13
3mγ  -0.044 -65.633 0.375 72.809 
14
3mγ  0.195 20.742 0.500 37.009 
23
3mγ  -0.004 -15.754 0.351 35.394 
24
3mγ  0.107 22.955 0.181 54.912 
34
3mγ  0.063 51.468 -0.122 -89.938 
Log-likelihood at convergence -279.805 -309.497 
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The Hausman specification test is applied to evaluate the difference between the 
epistemic and behavioral reinforcement learning models. The Hausman statistic can 
be viewed as a measure of distance between the epistemic and the behavioral 
reinforcement learning model estimators. If this distance is short, then these models 
are not significantly different. The null hypothesis is: 
0H : Our model is mis-specified against the alternative model 
The Hausman statistic value for two learning models is: 
[ ] [ ] [ ] 61.917391' =−−−= − rururu VVH ββββ  
The chi-square value for 26 degrees of freedom and 95% confidence level is 38.89 
( 89.382 05.0,21 =χ ). The above Hausman static value (91739.6) is much higher than the 
chi-square value (38.89). From this chi-square test result, the above null hypothesis 
can be rejected. Accordingly, we conclude that the epistemic learning model for the 
three-player experiment is well-specified and that there is a difference between the 
epistemic and behavioral reinforcement learning model specifications in the epistemic 
learning game. Thus, both learning models describe the player’s bidding behavior 
well but in different ways. 
These estimation results and Hausman statistical tests show that players did not 
behaved consistent according to only one of the cognitive learning rules in sequential 
games. The results of the Hausman test prove that both models are well-specified and 
fit the epistemic learning game datasets well. Based on this, we cannot determine 
which model is better to describe behavior in the epistemic learning game. Therefore, 
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the mixed learning model should be developed to describe this player’s mixed 
cognitive bidding behavior. This mixed learning model can describe the learning 
process and can capture the impact of players’ interactive cognitive learning 
processes. The next section presents the mixed learning models. 
 
7.5. DML Mixed Learning Models 
We found that some players did not use all of the available information, such as 
competitors’ past choices in the epistemic game. Accordingly, some decisions were 
made by players based on the behavioral reinforcement learning rule, even though 
they participating in the epistemic learning game.  The either or both of cognitive 
learning rules determined how players behaved during each round of the epistemic 
learning game. The estimation results in the previous section support this 
phenomenon. Based on this, we propose model specifications and estimation 
procedures for the mixed learning process described in Chapter 4.  
The dynamic mixed logit model structure can provide the estimation results for 
two types of mixed learning models. The first model assumes that players behave 
independently according to either cognitive learning rule for each game and do not 
consider the competitors’ cognitive learning rules before making a decision in the 
epistemic learning game. For the second model, the players’ cognitive learning 
beliefs are dynamically affected by competitors’ cognitive learning rules, maximizing 
their utility in the epistemic learning game. Therefore, mixed learning model II can 
capture the effect of interdependence among players for cognitive learning process on 
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bidding behavior. Tables 7.9 and 7.10 show the estimation results for the mixed 
learning model I for the two-player experiment using epistemic learning data. 
 
Table 7.9 Estimated parameters of the mixed learning DML model I using epistemic 
learning data (two-player experiment) 
Attributes Estimates T-value 
Initial Value (
Iβ ) -0.100 -26.618 
Constant(alt1, 10β ) 0.058 28.599 
Constant(alt2, 20β ) 0.023 9.601 
Constant(alt3, 30β ) -0.087 -35.257 
Possible Payoff ( 1β ) 0.002 34.981 
Avg. payoff ( 2β ) 0.322 6.847 
Sequence of choice ( 3β ) 0.250 13.824 
Habit persistence 1 ( 4β ) -0.056 -28.276 
E
1α  0.441 10.464 
E
2α  0.194 15.621 
1ρ  0.613 38.410 
2ρ  (Habit persistence 2) 0.375 85.485 
12
12γ  0.346 33.498 
13
12γ  -0.246 -33.748 
14
12γ  -0.118 -29.336 
23
12γ  -0.075 -52.230 
24
12γ  0.023 37.169 
34
12γ  0.099 76.517 
12
21γ  -0.202 -12.283 
13
21γ  0.580 56.308 
14
21γ  0.245 43.217 
23
21γ  -0.156 -42.791 
24
21γ  -0.116 -31.736 
34
21γ  -0.165 -17.361 
Log-likelihood at convergence -177.745 
 
The explanatory variables in mixed learning model I have a significant positive 
impact on bid choice behavior. The coefficients and behavioral interpretation for 
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those results are consistent with the findings presented in Section 7.2. The 
coefficients for the expected payoffs and choice experience related to the player’s 
epistemic and behavioral reinforcement learning process are positive and strongly 
significant. The degree of propensity ( Enα ) for players 1 and 2 in the behavioral 
reinforcement learning process is almost 0.6 and 0.8, respectively, over 80 games. 
The players’ bidding preference increases with the increasing effects of all 
explanatory variables included in the behavioral reinforcement learning model.  
Mixed learning model I assumes that players independently follow cognitive 
learning rules without considering competitors’ cognitive rules. Table 7.9 indicates 
that the degree of propensity for the epistemic learning rule for players 1 and 2 is 
0.441 and 0.194, respectively. This implies that both players prefer to conduct 
themselves like the behavioral reinforcement learning players. Player 2 is more likely 
to behave according to the behavioral reinforcement learning process than Player 1.  
Player 1 is more likely to behave according to the epistemic learning process than 
Player2. These results imply that, for the two-player experiment, players apply both 
cognitive learning rules in the decision-making process for all games. 
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Table 7.10 Estimated parameters of the mixed learning DML model II using 
epistemic learning data (two-player experiment) 
Attributes Estimates T-value 
Initial Value ( Iβ ) -0.551 -41.718 
Constant(alt1, 10β ) -0.306 -12.438 
Constant(alt2, 20β ) -0.107 -13.877 
Constant(alt3, 30β ) -0.134 -22.762 
Possible Payoff ( 1β ) 0.299 52.079 
Avg. payoff ( 2β ) 0.283 20.734 
Sequence of choice ( 3β ) 0.201 34.548 
Habit persistence 1 ( 4β ) -0.011 -14.332 
EE
12α  0.170 18.665 
ER
12α  0.166 108.246 
RR
12α  0.502 18.533 
1ρ  0.509 31.540 
2ρ  (Habit persistence 2) 0.128 19.782 
12
12γ  0.123 18.898 
13
12γ  0.301 26.945 
14
12γ  -0.394 -78.561 
23
12γ  -0.009 -52.424 
24
12γ  0.443 128.395 
34
12γ  0.050 39.778 
12
21γ  0.232 40.825 
13
21γ  -0.435 -30.693 
14
21γ  0.453 31.839 
23
21γ  0.086 138.850 
24
21γ  0.500 17.756 
34
21γ  0.026 45.805 
Log-likelihood at convergence -201.622 
 
Table 7.10 illustrates the estimation results of mixed learning model II for the two-
player experiment using the epistemic learning game datasets.  This model II can 
capture the effect of the interaction among players’ cognitive learning processes on 
the bidding behavior. This impact is represented by the parameters ( m
nα ) as the 
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degree of propensity for the m  type of mixed cognitive learning process over all 
games, which is also presented in Table 7.11 for the two-player experiment. The 
coefficients for possible payoff, average payoff, and sequence of choice are positive, 
indicating that players are more likely to choose that bid price with high expected 
payoffs in the epistemic learning model, high average payoffs, and more recent 
choice experience in the behavioral reinforcement learning model. The coefficient for 
habit persistence is negative, which is consistent with the results in Section 7.2.    
 
Table 7.11 The mixed cognitive learning (MCL) index and estimation results from 
the mixed learning DML model II for the two-player experiment 
Player 1 Player 2  
m
nα 26 # of observation 





12α  0.166 13 
Behavioral  
Reinforcement 






12α  0.502 40 
 
Table 7.11 presents the mixed cognitive learning index and estimation results 
associated with MCL from mixed learning model II. The parameter for the behavioral 


































reinforcement learning propensity for both players ( RR12α ) is the highest value for the 
mixed cognitive learning processes. This is consistent with the findings for the two-
player DMNP mixed learning model II shown in Table 6.6. We expect this 
phenomenon, since both players also show a high degree of propensity for the 
behavioral reinforcement learning process in the DML mixed learning model I (see 
Table 7.10). However, this does not mean that both models describe players’ mixed 
learning processes in the same way. Table 7.12 presents the mixed cognitive learning 
index and the estimation results associated with MCL from mixed learning model I; 
we could compare these results to the previous estimation results in Table 7.11.  
 
Table 7.12 The mixed cognitive learning (MCL) index and estimation results from 
the mixed learning DML model I for the two-player experiment 
Player 1 Player 2  
m
nα  # of observation 





12α  0.355 28 
Behavioral  
Reinforcement 






















Figure 7.1 Comparison of the propensity for the mixed cognitive learning process 
between mixed learning DML models I and II 
 
The joint probability equation (6.1) in Section 6.5 provides the parameter values 
for each type of mixed learning process among players, based on that assumption that 
players’ cognitive learning processes are dependent on one another. In Figure 7.1, 
both models show the players’ high propensity for the behavioral reinforcement 
learning process (RR). In mixed learning model II, the propensity for three types of 
mixed learning processes among players (EE, ER, and RE) is nearly identical.  In 
mixed learning model I, Player 1’s propensity for epistemic learning and Player 2’s 
propensity for behavioral reinforcement learning (ER) is higher than the other two 
types of mixed learning processes (EE and RE), which demonstrates the difference 
between the two modeling frameworks. The following cross-tabulation and chi-
square test are applied to determine the difference between the models in terms of 
describing mixed cognitive learning behavior.  
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Table 7.13 Model *MCL cross-tabulation for the two-player DML model 
  Player’s Mixed Cognitive Learning (MCL) Total 
  EE ER RE RR  








33.3% 68.3% 40.9% 47.4% 50.0% 
 % of Total 4.4% 17.5% 5.6% 22.5% 50.0% 








66.7% 31.7% 59.1% 52.6% 50.0% 
 % of Total 8.8% 8.1% 8.1% 25.0% 50.0% 








100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 % of Total 13.1% 25.6% 13.8% 47.5% 100.0% 
 
Table 7.14 Chi-Square Tests for the two-player DML model  
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 8.759 3 0.033 
Likelihood Ratio 8.938 3 0.030 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
0.124 1 0.725 
N of Valid Cases 160   
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The chi-square statistical test results in Table 7.14 show that the mixed learning 
models describe players’ behavior differently. More specifically, player’s bidding 
behavior is affected by other competitors’ epistemic or behavioral cognitive learning 
process. This result is consistent with the results in Section 6.5 for the two-player 
mixed learning DMNP models. 
As noted, the additional datasets for the different auction types and multiple-player 
cases were collected to test the dynamic strategy choice modeling framework. The 
basic estimation results for each cognitive learning model are presented in Tables 7.1 
and 7.2. Here, two additional mixed learning models are investigated using the three-
player experimental datasets. Tables 7.15 and 7.16 present the estimation results. 
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Table 7.15 Estimated parameters of the mixed learning DML model I using epistemic 
learning data (three-player experiment) 
Attributes Estimates T-value 
Initial Value ( Iβ ) 0.330 151.824 
Constant(alt1, 10β ) -0.217 -37.420 
Constant(alt2, 20β ) -0.334 -86.953 
Constant(alt3, 30β ) -0.292 -65.758 
Possible Payoff ( 1β ) 0.182 40.314 
Avg. payoff ( 2β ) 0.004 192.846 
Sequence of choice ( 3β ) 0.555 47.691 
Habit persistence 1 ( 4β ) 0.129 152.221 
E
1α  0.480 24.535 
E
2α  0.335 42.865 
E
3α  0.801 156.102 
1ρ  0.343 47.004 
2ρ  (Habit persistence 2) 0.363 31.535 
12
1mγ  -0.174 -262.313 
13
1mγ  0.019 27.345 
14
1mγ  0.707 49.719 
23
1mγ  -0.231 -79.349 
24
1mγ  -0.091 -52.204 
34
1mγ  -0.280 -94.530 
12
2mγ  0.072 38.562 
13
2mγ  0.312 41.965 
14
2mγ  -0.206 -25.220 
23
2mγ  0.584 54.203 
24
2mγ  0.440 32.980 
34
2mγ  -0.433 -152.919 
12
3mγ  -0.486 -41.135 
13
3mγ  0.276 29.024 
14
3mγ  0.388 44.104 
23
3mγ  -0.260 -136.209 
24
3mγ  -0.115 -47.564 
34
3mγ  0.491 136.097 
Log-likelihood at convergence -344.833 
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The coefficients for the explanatory variables included in Table 7.15 are positive 
and statistically significant. This implies that past payoffs and choice experience are 
important determinants of bidding strategy. The degree of propensity for the 
epistemic learning process for Players 1, 2, and 3 is 0.480, 0.335, and 0.801, 
respectively. The propensity for the behavioral reinforcement learning propensity is 
0.520, 0.665, and 0.199 for Players 1, 2, and 3, respectively. Mixed learning model I 
assumes that there is no interaction among players in terms of making decisions 
according to their cognitive learning rules; hence, a player only relies on their own 
cognitive learning rules to make their decision, but they can switch learning rules by 
considering payoffs and choice experience. Under this assumption, Players 1 and 2 
behave according to the behavioral reinforcement learning process in over 50% of all 
games, while Player 3 behaves according to the epistemic learning rule for almost 
80% of all epistemic games. 
Table 7.16 presents the mixed learning model II estimation results for the three-
player experiment. The statistical significance and coefficient signs for the 
explanatory variables are same as those for the estimation results in Section 7.2. 
Accordingly, the behavioral interpretations related to those variables remain 
consistent. The coefficient for average payoff is negative, which is consistent with the 
results presented in Table 7.4, since mixed learning model II combines elements from 
both the epistemic and behavioral reinforcements learning models. 
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Table 7.16 Estimated parameters of the mixed learning DML model II using 
epistemic learning data (three-player experiment) 
Attributes Estimates T-value 
Initial Value ( Iβ ) 0.0143 56.893 
Constant(alt1, 10β ) -0.0095 -39.357 
Constant(alt2, 20β ) -0.0150 -102.142 
Constant(alt3, 30β ) -0.0133 -98.177 
Possible Payoff ( 1β ) 0.0080 100.789 
Avg. payoff ( 2β ) -0.0008 -200.474 
Sequence of choice ( 3β ) 0.0249 36.455 
Habit persistence 1 ( 4β ) 0.0068 56.804 
EEE
123α  0.0220 59.790 
EER
123α  0.0942 208.301 
ERE
123α  0.0647 140.693 
ERR
123α  0.1664 86.668 
REE
123α  0.0391 63.507 
RER
123α  0.0000 -99.299 
RRR
123α  0.0000 -76.174 
1ρ  0.0153 25.221 
2ρ  (Habit persistence 2) 0.0160 468.396 
12
1mγ  -0.0072 -83.772 
13
1mγ  0.0019 80.596 
14
1mγ  0.0319 57.231 
23
1mγ  -0.0100 -81.452 
24
1mγ  -0.0045 -55.092 
34
1mγ  -0.0123 -49.235 
12
2mγ  0.0037 171.160 
13
2mγ  0.0138 63.165 
14
2mγ  -0.0086 -143.835 
23
2mγ  0.0264 80.806 
24
2mγ  0.0198 29.456 
34
2mγ  -0.0199 -46.507 
12
3mγ  -0.0217 -43.350 
13
3mγ  0.0123 35.141 
14
3mγ  0.0175 43.303 
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23
3mγ  -0.0122 -65.604 
24
3mγ  -0.0064 -72.919 
34
3mγ  0.2771 30.589 
Log-likelihood at convergence -423.292 
 
Table 7.17 shows the index and estimation results for the propensity of  m  type of 
mixed cognitive learning process from the mixed learning DML model II. The degree 
of propensity coefficients for seven types of mixed cognitive learning is statistically 
significant, as shown in Table 7.16.   
 
Table 7.17 The mixed cognitive learning (MCL) index and estimation results from 
the mixed learning DML model II for the three-player experiment 
Player 1 Player 2 Player 3  
m
nα  
# of  
observation 
Epistemic Epistemic Epistemic 
EEE













































123α  0.614 49 
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In mixed learning model II, each player’s decision is affected by the competitor’s 
cognitive learning rules. Therefore, the interaction among players in terms of making 
decisions according to their cognitive learning rules result in the above parameters for 
the degree of propensity for each type of mixed cognitive learning process.  
The estimation results in Table 7.17 indicate that the degree of propensity for 
Players 1 and 2 in the behavioral reinforcement learning process and Player 3 in the 
epistemic learning process ( RRE123α ) is 0.614, which is the highest value for all mixed 
cognitive learning processes. This phenomenon is consistent with the results 
presented in Table 7.15 ( E1α =0.480, 
E
2α =0.335, and 
E
3α =0.801). Players 1 and 2 
behave more like behavioral reinforcement learning players, while Player 3 behaves 
more like the epistemic learning player. However, from this result, we cannot 
conclude that both mixed learning models are the same statistically, which means that 
there is independence among players in terms of making decisions according to their 
cognitive learning rules. 
The following chi-square test for independence is used to evaluate the statistically 
significant difference between proportions for each m  type of degree of propensity 
for players’ mixed cognitive learning processes from the mixed learning models, 
using epistemic learning dataset. To perform the chi-square test, we recall the 
estimation results in Table 7.15. From these results ( E1α =0.480, 
E
2α =0.335, and 
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E
3α =0.801), we provide the joint probability 27  values for each mixed type of 
cognitive learning process ( mnα ). In mixed learning model I, we assume the 
independence of cognitive learning processes among players. Therefore, the joint 
probability of mixed three-player cognitive learning process is calculated by: 
EEEEEE
321123 αααα ××= , 
REEEER
321123 αααα ××= , 
EREERE
321123 αααα ××= , 
RREERR
321123 αααα ××= , 
EERREE
321123 αααα ××= , 
RERRER
321123 αααα ××= , 
RRRRRR
321123 αααα ××= , 
ERRRRE
321123 αααα ××=                                                              (7.1) 
Table 7.18 shows the joint probability for the each type of cognitive learning 
process, calculated using the mixed learning model I estimation results for each 
player’s degree of propensity for each type of cognitive learning process ( E1α =0.480, 
E
2α =0.335, and 
E
3α =0.801). Using these values along with the estimation results in 
Table 7.17, we provide the following cross-tabulation analysis and chi-square results 
in Tables 7.19 and 7.20 for the three-player experiment.  
 
                                                 
27  Joint probability is the probability of two events in conjunction and the 
probability of both events together.  
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Table 7.18 The mixed cognitive learning (MCL) index and estimation results from 
the mixed learning DML model I for three-player experiment 
Player 1 Player 2 Player 3  
m
nα 28 
# of  
observation 
Epistemic Epistemic Epistemic 
EEE
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Figure 7.2 Comparison of the propensity for the mixed cognitive learning process 
between mixed learning DML models I and model II (three-player experiment) 
 
Figure 7.2 presents the propensity among players to behave according to each 
mixed cognitive learning process. There are eight types of mixed learning processes 
for the three-player experiment. The propensity for the RRE29 type is higher than for 
any other mixed cognitive learning process for both models. However, the degree of 
propensity for the RRE mixed learning process provided by mixed learning model II 
is much higher than mixed learning model I estimation results. Mixed learning model 
I provides a higher value of propensity for the ERE mixed learning process compared 
to the other types (EEE, EER, ERR, REE, RER, and RRR). 
The following cross-tabulation displays the joint distribution of the estimation results 
                                                 
29 Players 1 and 2 in the behavioral reinforcement process and Player 3 in the 
epistemic learning process 
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from the mixed learning models I and II. It shows the different degrees of propensity 
for each type of mixed cognitive learning process among players.  To evaluate the 
significant difference between the models, the chi-square test is performed and the 
test results are included in Table 7.20. The null hypothesis is that there is no 
interaction among players in terms of making decisions according to their cognitive 
learning rules.  
Table 7.20 demonstrates that we can reject that null hypothesis, which means that 
player’s cognitive learning belief on the choice decision is correlated to competitor’s 
choice decision associated with his/her cognitive learning process. Therefore, the 
mixed learning model II is preferred to mixed learning model I. 
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Table 7.19 Model *MCL cross-tabulation for the three-player DML model 
  Player’s Mixed Cognitive Learning (MCL)  
  EEE EER ERE ERR REE RER RRR RRE Total 















6.3% 1.9% 12.5% 3.1% 6.9% 1.9% 3.8% 13.8% 50.0% 
















1.3% 5.0% 3.1% 8.1% 1.9% 0% 0% 30.6% 50.0% 
















Table 7.20 Chi-Square Tests for the three-player DML model 
 Value df 
Asymp. Sig. 
(2-sided) 
Pearson Chi-Square 44.001 7 .000 
Likelihood Ratio 49.368 7 .000 
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
10.575 1 .001 




Chapter 8. Conclusions 
8.1. Summary of Research Accomplishments  
The main objective of this dissertation is to develop a theoretical framework and 
methodology to model a player’s dynamic strategy choice behavior under the 
competitive environment, by extending and adapting the existing model framework. 
This research is different from the previous studies in experimental economics and 
traditional transportation demand studies. First of all, this dissertation introduces the 
advanced discrete choice model, and cognitive learning process into the modeling of 
bidder's behavior, in contrast to the traditional game theory approach. In particular, 
the multinomial probit and mixed logit modeling frameworks were applied to the 
estimation of dynamic strategy choice behavior models, for the data obtained from 
two experiments, by allowing for a more flexible correlation structure of the error 
term. Furthermore, we present the concept of competition impact into dynamic choice 
model structures. Therefore, this dissertation introduces a new perspective on 
transportation behavior modeling in competitive environments to show how learning 
models can describe a player’s choice behavior in a sequential auction type of game. 
Additionally, it shows the possibility of how those learning processes can be 
combined to make a better model and combines methodological strengths of earlier 
studies by estimating the cognitive learning models. 
The interaction among players’ decisions was examined with the observations of 
bidding behavior, since the decision problem is related to players’ strategies due to 
the interdependence of competitors’ bids, costs, and payoffs. Two experiments were 
 179 
conducted in which decision-makers are in hypothetical bidding situations. The first 
experiments included two players who each separately participated 80 times in the 
two types of games, and who were able to choose between four discrete alternative 
bid prices each time, and the first price auction game was applied. The second 
experiment included three players with the same conditions as the first experiment 
except the auction type; the second price auction was applied. Initially, this 
dissertation focuses on the two types of cognitive learning processes; thus two types 
of games were performed related to two types of cognitive learning rules: epistemic 
and behavioral reinforcement learning processes. The behavioral reinforcement game 
provided subjects with enough information about the player’s own payoffs and 
his/her choice records, while the epistemic learning game gave full information about 
the player’s own experience, as well as competitors’ choice history. Those 
experiments were performed to observe actual players’ game-to-game dynamic 
decision in a different type of auction game. The data acquired from the two 
experiments allows researchers to investigate the processes determining players’ 
strategies, choice decisions in response to different levels of cognitive capacity and 
information. 
In the previous works from the experimental economics, the simple power or logit 
form of probability choice modeling framework was applied to experimental datasets 
which included the dynamic bidding choice behavior. In this dissertation, the 
dynamic multinomial probit and dynamic mixed logit models were used to allow 
more flexible model specification through parameters in the variance-covariance 
matrix. Moreover, the unobserved influences of a player’s competitive interaction on 
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the decision-making process, state dependence, and auto correlation were captured in 
error structures.  
Two learning model structures were developed for the strategy choice in a 
sequential auction type of game addressing both epistemic and behavioral 
reinforcement learning processes. The epistemic learning model assumes that in a 
repeated game, players always know their own characteristics, but they have 
incomplete information regarding their opponents' learning belief, or rationality. 
Players can draw the distribution of competitors’ action by observing the whole 
sequence of the others' decisions. A player does not know the opponents’ cognitive 
learning types, or belief from their choice decisions, but they can conjecture the 
competitors’ instrumental rationality, which is some form of stationarity of the 
competitors’ behavior (Walliser, 1998). In the behavioral reinforcement learning 
model, players with limited rationality have knowledge about their own opportunities 
and payoffs in repeated auction games, but they could not predict the type of 
opponent or his/her past actions and payoffs. Players revised their experience 
according to the utility obtained from each strategy in past actions. In this process, the 
player imitates past actions reinforced by successful strategies in past games. Hence, 
a player’s utility is updated by observing his or her sequence of actions and 
corresponding payoffs. 
The estimation results from two cognitive learning models were provided to 
describe the players’ bidding behavior. It confirmed that players who hold to the 
epistemic learning rule are more likely to use all information about their opponent’s 
type to make a decision. Furthermore, in the epistemic learning game, players also 
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adopted the behavioral reinforcement learning rule, as well as the epistemic learning 
rule in strategy decisions. The Hausman statistical test was performed to test for 
model miss-specification. The test results illustrated that players did not always 
behave in a consistent manner with only one of the cognitive learning rules in 
sequential games. Through the Hausman test, the epistemic learning model was found 
to be well specified and fitted to the epistemic learning game datasets. In the 
behavioral reinforcement game, the estimation results demonstrated that players 
relied on their own historical payoffs, and choice decisions to determine their strategy 
for the next game because that player does not know the opponent’s type and future 
payoffs. 
In the epistemic learning game, the estimation results showed that both epistemic 
and behavioral reinforcement models were well fitted to describe the players’ bidding 
behavior for the epistemic game. The results implied that players behave in a manner 
with the mixed learning process, which incorporates both elements from the epistemic 
and behavioral reinforcement learning processes. Players can switch the strategic 
learning belief from either one of the two learning processes to the other (epistemic 
and behavioral reinforcement). Therefore, the mixed learning model was investigated 
to explain the players’ bidding behavior corresponding to the mixed learning process. 
Two types of mixed learning models were investigated in a sequential epistemic 
learning auction game. The mixed learning models incorporated appropriate elements 
of behavioral reinforcement and epistemic learning approaches and were found to be 
useful in improving their predictive accuracy, since it included two learning models 
as special cases. The models also utilized all the information provided by the players 
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and the game environment. One mixed learning model made an assumption about the 
interdependence among players’ cognitive learning processes, while the other showed 
the independence of these processes. Both mixed learning models provided the 
players’ degree of propensity toward each type of mixed learning process. We 
compared and examined these mixed learning structures for parameters with clear 
psychological interpretations using statistical chi-square tests. These tests proved that 
that player’s cognitive learning belief on the choice decision was correlated to 
competitor’s choice decision associated with his/her cognitive learning process. 
The error components provide the covariance in unobserved factors across 
alternatives, times, and players. The estimates for the variance and covariance terms 
for bid price choice were statistically significant at a reasonable confidence level. 
From The coefficients for the error term for competition that impact the bid price 
choice for each player were different, which implies that each player responds 
differently to other players’ choice decisions, relative to the competitive impact of his 
or her own decisions. Consequently, we found that the error term incorporating the 
impact of a player’s competition on bid price choice needs to be specified. This 
demonstrates how important it is for the model to capture the effect of unobserved 
interactions between competitors. By transforming an unobservable into an 
observable interaction, we can witness directly how parameter estimates change when 
new information is introduced 
The perspective adopted in this study is that of an analyst or observer (which may 
also be a competitor) seeking to predict the outcome of the bidding process followed 
by a player in a repeated auction game. The dynamic strategy choice model 
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framework was presented to recognize, in specification and parameterization, the 
nature of multi-player interaction and its dynamics over multiple bids (plays). A 
dynamic strategy choice model, which uses concepts from both discrete choice theory 
and game theory to model bidder (carrier) behavior in repeated auction-type games, 
can explain people’s adjustment patterns when dealing with complicated 
transportation-related decision-making problems. This type of modeling can be 
applied in spot market situations related to transportation auctions.  
 
8.2. Applications and Future Researches 
While motivated by and intended for freight service procurement marketplaces, the 
model framework and structure developed in this study is applicable to other 
competitive situations that entail repeated decisions over time. For example, air 
carriers must continually make service and pricing decisions in anticipation of or in 
response to competitors’ actions. Urban travelers have cognitive learning rules that 
correspond to behavioral reinforcement learning in a low information environment. 
They do not model the impact of their actions on other passengers’ utilities or their 
environment. However, using information technology in an urban network system 
allows people to behave according to epistemic learning rules; they consider other 
traveler’s reactions to the IT system with respect to route choice and mode choice.  
For the freight service market, the dynamic choice model can be applied to 
carriers’ bidding behavior in an Internet transportation marketplace. Carriers model 
the behavior of other carriers and shippers in order to maximize profits. Given the 
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assumption of the auction and the player types of a strategic problem, carriers may 
behave according to epistemic or behavioral reinforcement learning rules, depending 
upon their level of rationality. Shippers also predict behavior using the dynamic 
strategy choice model; thus, their actions can be predicted depending on their rational 
and computational capabilities and the complexity of their own logistic problems. In 
addition, air travel agents can use this model framework to consider interactions 
between carriers and passengers. Based on this information, they can model their own 
behavior to obtain profits.  
There are many ways to extend this study for future research. This study 
introduced two characteristic types of cognitive learning processes. Two separate 
model structures were presented in the methodology section, using different 
assumptions of players’ skill to collect information on player interactions. Both 
models can be applied in the low information environment. With the behavioral 
reinforcement learning model, if a player does not know his or her own payoff, a 
different model specification is required. The epistemic model only uses the form of 
stationarity of opponent type (past choices). In epistemic learning model, we must be 
careful to specify the type of beliefs that must be used as inputs into these models. 
The model can be improved by collecting more information on such factors as 
opponent payoffs. The use of this information allows for the player’s behavior to be 
explained in certain types of games. However, the above model specification, 
incorporating low information, is important in the construction of a more general 
model in real low information environments.  
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From the myopic perspective on the learning model specification, we do not 
consider the depreciation effect of the amount of game experience used for 
calculating the average payoff, cumulative sequence of choice, and probability of 
competitor’s choice decision variable values. As players have more experience, the 
effect of the previous experience on the current choice will be depreciated. Therefore, 
we need to consider those parameters for each variable included in model 
specifications for both learning models.  
We used two experimental datasets for two and three-player cases. As a result, the 
models are limited to applying to various types of auction game datasets. Therefore, 
we need more experiments to provide the general model specification for each 
cognitive learning process. Moreover, if we can have more players, the model 
structures for the error terms and utility specification can be changed and the 
subsequent estimation results will be different. We expect that a more competitive 
environment allows players to behave in different ways to show the adjustment 
learning patterns compared to a less competitive environment. Furthermore, we need 
to consider the impact on the players’ bidding behavior between on-line and off-line 
sequential games. The number of players in a game is fixed throughout all games in 
this dissertation. However, the number of bidders in online auctions is likely to vary 
for each game. Therefore, more uncertainty can exist in on-line game than in non-
online auctions. Those uncertainty factors should be modeled and included as the 
component of the utility function, and as unobserved noise factors.  
Despite the above contribution and possible applications, we do not believe that 
our learning model captures all significant aspects of learning in games. In this 
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dissertation, we did not consider the private information for each player, which can 
determine their cost, and more public information (e.g. fleet size, number of players, 
auction type, player’s previous experience, fleet status at a given time; location or 
time window of available truck on schedule, etc). We need to specify what other 
factors can affect the decision-making process in the game, and how we can model it 
differently. Therefore, more specific public or private information parameters can be 
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